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(DIS)OWNING RELIGIOUS SPEECH 
 
B. Jessie Hill* 
INTRODUCTION 
To claims of a right to equal citizenship, one of the primary responses 
has long been to assert the right of private property.1 One need only think of 
Dred Scott v. Sandford,2 for example, or the sit-ins of the civil rights 
movement to see the pull exerted by property rhetoric and principles on 
those who would resist the demands of inclusion and equality.3 The latest 
iteration of this dynamic, opposing property to equality, has taken shape in 
the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence concerning the constitutionality 
of governmental choices with respect to the display of religious symbolism. 
The permissibility of religious symbolism in public places has been a 
significant concern of Establishment Clause jurisprudence for the past thirty 
years, since the Supreme Court first held, in 1980, that a law requiring the 
display of the Ten Commandments in public schools was unconstitutional.4 
Beginning with Lynch v. Donnelly5 in 1984, the Supreme Court decided a 
series of cases in which it struggled to clarify the doctrine and the nature of 
  
 * Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Research, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. Versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Law and Reli-
gion Roundtable at Brooklyn Law School, the Case Western Summer Scholarship Workshop, the UCLA 
Legal Theory Workshop, and the Temple University Law School Faculty Colloquium. I would like to 
thank all those who gave me truly invaluable feedback in those and other settings, especially Jane Bar-
on, Joseph Blocher, Alan Brownstein, Chip Carter, Caroline Corbin, Mary Jean Dolan, Chris Eisgruber, 
Jon Entin, Dave Fagundes, Abner Greene, Andrew Koppelman, Ray Ku, Jacqui Lipton, Chris Lund, 
Chip Lupu, Seana Shiffrin, Steve Shiffrin, Gary Simson, Nelson Tebbe, Laura Underkuffler, Jonathan 
Varat, and Rob Vischer. 
 1 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1857) (stating, in response to the 
argument that Dred Scott should be accorded the rights of citizenship, that “[t]he unhappy black race . . . 
were never thought of or spoken to except as property”), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. 
 2 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV. 
 3 See id. at 493-94. Free association is another right that is often opposed to equality claims. See, 
e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-77 (1976) (rejecting the claim of parents that the integra-
tion of schools violates their right to freedom of association). 
 4 The first Supreme Court case dealing with public displays of religious symbolism was Stone v. 
Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam), which held unconstitutional the display of the Ten Com-
mandments in public schools. However, Stone was a brief per curiam opinion utilizing no discernible 
doctrinal test. 
 5 465 U.S. 668 (1984).  
362 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 20:2 
the right at stake, including County of Allegheny v. ACLU6 in 1989, Capitol 
Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette7 in 1995, and the companion 
cases Van Orden v. Perry8 and McCreary County v. ACLU9 in 2005. 
Though the doctrinal framework shifted somewhat, the primary question 
that the Court consistently sought to answer in those cases concerned the 
social meaning of the display at issue, with a specific focus on whether that 
display had the purpose or effect of conveying a message to nonadherents 
that they were outsiders to the political community.10 In addition, and relat-
edly, the Court has issued a series of holdings in recent years asserting the 
rights of religious speakers of all kinds to be included in various speech 
fora alongside other speakers, religious or secular.11 To do otherwise, the 
Court has made clear, would constitute viewpoint discrimination that is 
inconsistent with the Free Speech Clause.12 
In two recent cases, however, the Court made a surprising turn away 
from its traditional analytic frameworks, focused on social meaning and 
nondiscrimination, toward the language of property.13 In particular, the 
Court has embraced one particular vision of property—viewing property as 
synonymous with both private property and the right to exclude—and ap-
plied it in its treatment of religious speech issues in those cases.14 The first 
of the recent cases, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,15 is a free speech case 
in which a municipality evaded a finding that it was discriminating against 
the plaintiff’s religious speech by claiming the “government speech” de-
fense.16 In the process, the defendant claimed as its own speech a facially 
religious monument of the Ten Commandments.17 The second case, Salazar 
v. Buono,18 which turned away an Establishment Clause challenge to a Latin 
cross in the middle of the Mojave National Preserve, focused on the literal 
ownership of the religious speech at issue in the case, rather than the social 
  
 6 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 7 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 8 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 9 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 10 See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Endorsement sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval 
sends the opposite message.”). 
 11 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001); Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993). 
 12 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107-10. 
 13 See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819 (2010) (plurality opinion); Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009).  
 14 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819; Summum, 555 U.S. at 469. 
 15 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 16 Id. at 464. 
 17 Id. at 464-67. 
 18 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). 
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meaning.19 What both cases have in common (other than that the plaintiffs 
did not prevail) is a claim, on one side, that the government has improperly 
and unconstitutionally excluded one religious group, both literally and met-
aphorically, and a response, on the other side, that is formulated in the lan-
guage of ownership, private property, and sovereignty, rather than that of 
social meaning or equality.20  
This Article explores the possible causes and implications of the 
Court’s recent embrace of property concepts and property rhetoric.21 This 
Article thus contributes to the substantial scholarship on the relationship 
between constitutional rights and property law—a body of scholarship that 
has, however, not yet fully explored the role of property law and rhetoric in 
religious display cases. More broadly, this Article attempts to examine, 
through the lens of the Supreme Court’s rhetoric, the intense emotional 
investment that both sides seem to have in the precise issue of the constitu-
tionality of symbolic religious expression in the (literal or metaphorical) 
public square.  
This Article argues that the Court has turned to the language and the 
law of private property partly as a way of avoiding the knotty questions 
raised by Establishment Clause and free speech doctrine. It further argues 
that the rhetoric of property functions on another level, as well. The Court’s 
property rhetoric legitimates and naturalizes the act of exclusion sanctioned 
by the Court’s decisions. It also gives the illusion of a concrete stake held 
by a religious majority—a material loss that is incurred when dominant 
religious symbols are removed. This Article thus proceeds from the intui-
tive view that the passion expressed by individuals both in favor of and 
against such religious expression requires some explanation, given the ap-
parently low material stakes and the concurrent difficulty that both sides 
have in articulating any precise benefit or harm.22  
One point about the Court’s use of property law and rhetoric bears 
emphasizing at the outset. Property is a rich and extraordinarily complex 
concept, and a large legal and philosophical literature has developed to elu-
cidate both the nature of property itself and the legal, cultural, and moral 
significance of property.23 Although some property scholars have embraced 
  
 19 Id. at 1811. 
 20 See id. at 1818; Summum, 555 U.S. at 469. 
 21 Although this Article observes a shift in the Supreme Court’s focus in the recent religious 
symbolism cases, it also notes that property has long been implicated in this jurisprudence and indeed, is 
inextricable from it. See infra Part I.A-C. Never before has property played such a prominent role in the 
decisional framework or the rhetoric of the religious symbolism cases, however. 
 22 See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 156-58 (2007) (discussing the “extreme passions these cases provoke”). 
 23 For a sampling of the wide array of works on the subject, see, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF 
PROPERTY IN LAW 68-69 (1997) (describing property as rights to take certain actions with respect to 
things, and thus understood partly as a right to exclude, but also as fundamentally embedded within our 
social relationships); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 
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the traditional understanding of property as signifying primarily the right to 
exclude,24 other understandings of property abound, and recently, numerous 
scholars have emphasized instead the inclusionary, public, and social di-
mensions of property.25 
It is not possible to do justice to that nuanced body of literature within 
the scope of this Article, nor is it one of the goals of this Article to do so. 
Instead, this Article contends that the Supreme Court adopted one particular 
conception of property in Summum and Buono—namely, the traditional 
view of property rights as centering on the right to exclude. Moreover, as 
explained in greater depth below, the Supreme Court elided the distinction 
between public and private property, often assuming that government enti-
ties are entitled to dispose of their land in the exact manner of a private 
person, and that government ownership of property must be treated as vir-
tually identical, for all intents and purposes, to private ownership.26 This 
Article criticizes the Supreme Court’s use of property-as-exclusion in these 
religious speech cases as inapposite, not only because that understanding of 
property is possibly flawed or at least highly contestable, but also because 
property-as-exclusion is a uniquely misguided concept when constitutional 
values are at stake.  
At the same time, it is no contradiction to acknowledge that property 
has been implicated in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of religious sym-
bolism all along, or that it is intertwined with the protection of many other 
  
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 746-47 (2009) (rejecting the notion of property as dominated by exclusion); Jane 
B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 920-21 (2010); Morris R. 
Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 11-12 (1928); Hanoch Dagan, Property and the 
Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 84, 85 (2006); Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and 
Speech: The Legacy of Pruneyard v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 36-40 (1997) (taking an extreme 
view of property as synonymous with the right to exclude); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right 
to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 734 (1998) (defending the view of property as the right to exclude); 
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1938-40 (2005) (outlining an under-
standing of property as providing entrance to a community, not exit from it); Carol M. Rose, Property as 
Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 37, 38-39 (1990); Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 128 
(1990).  
 24 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 23, at 36; Merrill, supra note 23, at 730. 
 25 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 23, at 746-47; Dagan, supra note 23, at 85; Peñalver, supra 
note 23, at 1938; see also generally PROPERTY & COMMUNITY, at xxxiii (Gregory S. Alexander & 
Eduardo M. Peñalver eds., 2010) (explaining how property theory should evaluate the interaction be-
tween the individual and the community); cf. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1693 (2012) (stating that “[t]here is no interest in exclusion per se” and that prop-
erty serves the interest in using things). 
 26 See infra note 27 and accompanying text. Professor David Fagundes has helpfully pointed out 
that exclusion may be an important aspect of private property, at least in our traditional conception of it, 
but that there is also a public dimension to property, which is often neglected. David Fagundes, Property 
Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652, 656 (2010). 
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constitutional rights, as well.27 Indeed, First Amendment scholars have long 
recognized the connection between property and speech. Ever since the rise 
of so-called “public forum doctrine,” according to which the government’s 
power to regulate speech depends on the nature of the forum in which the 
speech takes place, this connection has been made explicit, leading to a rich 
body of scholarship on the intersection of speech and property rights.28 
Most of this scholarship has focused on the concept of property in forum 
analysis, however; neither the importation of property concepts in the gov-
ernment speech doctrine nor the use of property law in Establishment 
Clause disputes has garnered as much attention.29 Indeed, the turn to proper-
  
 27 See Timothy Zick, Property as/and Constitutional Settlement, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1361, 1361 
(2010) (“Certain constitutional rights are intricately bound up with, and in some cases critically depend-
ent upon, access to and enjoyment of public properties.”). Professor Louis Seidman has thoughtfully 
examined the ways in which free speech rights and property rights are deeply intertwined, arguing that 
the strength of speech rights is directly proportional to the strength of economic rights. Louis Michael 
Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under the Regulatory State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1541, 1547 (2008). 
 28 It appears that Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. introduced the concept of the “public forum” in First 
Amendment doctrine in his classic article The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 11-12. Written in the midst of the civil rights movement, Professor Kalven’s article 
meditates upon the relationship between the state’s property interest in public property and the public’s 
free speech rights, arguing that “in an open democratic society the streets, the parks, and other public 
places are . . . a public forum that the citizen can commandeer; the generosity and empathy with which 
such facilities are made available is an index of freedom.” Id. at 11-12. Kalven thus famously spoke of a 
sort of “First-Amendment easement” on public property possessed by citizens. Id. at 13. More recently, 
Professor Timothy Zick has produced a deep and nuanced body of scholarship examining the relation-
ship among property, space, and constitutional rights—especially free speech rights. See, e.g., Zick, 
supra note 27, at 1385 (criticizing the use of private property principles to avoid constitutional issues in 
resolving cases in the equality, religion, and speech contexts); Timothy Zick, Property, Place, and 
Public Discourse, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 173, 178 (2006) (arguing that “the ‘forum’ concept, which 
is rooted in principles of [public] property, should be replaced by a distinct conception of ‘place’”); 
Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 439, 
441-43 (2006) (introducing the concept of “expressive place,” which is distinct from, and richer than, 
the concept of “place as res or property”). Like Professor Zick, Professor Calvin Massey has written 
critically of courts’ inclination to place free speech problems in a property framework. Calvin Massey, 
Public Fora, Neutral Governments, and the Prism of Property, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 310-11 (1999). 
And Professor Joseph Blocher has thoughtfully examined the expressive dimensions of property and 
property rights, with particular reference to the concept of government speech. Joseph Blocher, Gov-
ernment Property and Government Speech, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1413, 1416-17 (2011). 
 29 But see Zick, supra note 27, at 1386-1400 (discussing ownership of religious symbols); id. at 
1362 (thus, for example, “anti-establishment principles require that officials operate and maintain public 
places in a manner that is not perceived as endorsing, through symbolic displays or otherwise, particular 
religious sects or sectarianism”); Blocher, supra note 28, at 1416-17 (discussing government speech); 
Nelson Tebbe, Privatizing and Publicizing Speech, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70, 70 (2009). 
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ty in cases involving religious symbolism itself seems to be a relatively new 
phenomenon.30  
The doctrinal issues underlying cases such as Summum and Buono 
have not been fully resolved, moreover; the staying power of the Supreme 
Court’s property-based focus is thus of imminent importance. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case raising similar questions 
pertaining to the public or private nature of religious speech—privately 
financed and maintained crosses along public highways in Utah, commem-
orating fallen highway patrol officers.31 The denial came after much appar-
ent hesitation, and some commentators expect that the Court will have to 
return to these issues eventually.32  
This Article thus examines the significance of the recent appearance of 
property law and rhetoric in the Supreme Court’s religious symbolism cas-
es. Part I of this Article describes the Court’s decisions in Summum and 
Buono and briefly sketches the background of religious symbolism case law 
against which the Supreme Court decided those cases. That Part thus traces 
a shift to a “property paradigm” in the Court’s treatment of religious sym-
bolism. Part II considers possible doctrinal and pragmatic reasons for the 
shift. Part III then elaborates some of the troubling consequences of the 
focus on ownership of speech rather than on the meaning of the speech. 
This Article argues that the paradigm of property is an unfitting one to im-
port into the First Amendment domain, since property rhetoric and law, as 
mobilized by the Court in those cases, center around, justify, and naturalize 
inequality and exclusion—values that are inherently antithetical to Estab-
lishment Clause and Free Speech Clause values. Returning to the explana-
tory project of this Article, Part IV contains some tentative meditations on 
the deeper cause and meaning of the shift to ownership discourse within 
Establishment Clause doctrine, viewed in the broader context of the U.S. 
culture wars and the passionate response to this particular issue that those 
culture wars entail. In Part V, this Article concludes that, for all their flaws, 
the endorsement test and public forum doctrine, which the Court appears to 
  
 30 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470-71 (2009) (rejecting the plaintiff’s free 
speech claim by placing the government in the role of a private property owner who is free to exclude 
unwanted speech). 
 31 Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 13 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). 
 32 Dissenting from the denial of certiorari in the Utah Highway Patrol Association case, Justice 
Clarence Thomas asserted that “[i]t is difficult to imagine an area of the law more in need of clarity,” 
and insisted that the Court “should not now abdicate [its] responsibility to clean up [its] mess” but rather 
should reconsider the currently predominant Lemon/endorsement test. Id. at 22; see also Stephen Werm-
iel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Free Speech and Religious Freedom Intersect in Case of Utah Crosses, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 24, 2011, 11:13 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/10/free-speech-and-
religious-freedom-intersect-in-case-of-utah-crosses (noting that the Court listed the case three times for 
consideration at the Justices’ private conferences without deciding whether to hear it, and noting that the 
case raises several issues left unresolved in Summum and Buono). 
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have temporarily marginalized, are superior approaches to the problem of 
public displays of religious symbolism. The Court should therefore return 
to its prior framework. It can, if necessary, avoid aggravating the divisive-
ness of religious symbolism disputes through more careful calibration of 
remedies, instead of modifying substantive doctrine. 
I. FROM SOCIAL MEANING TO PROPERTY 
When evaluating public displays of religious symbolism, the Supreme 
Court’s approach has been to ensure that the government obeys the princi-
ples of nonendorsement and equality, both by avoiding any actual or per-
ceived endorsement of religion and by ensuring that public fora are open to 
all speakers, religious and nonreligious, on equal terms.33 Pleasant Grove 
City v. Summum and Salazar v. Buono, the two most recent Supreme Court 
cases dealing with religious symbolism, appeared to marginalize the “en-
dorsement/equality” approach, however.34 Those two cases adopted what 
might be called a “property framework” for analysis. In both cases, the 
Court’s analysis and result turned primarily on the ownership and attribu-
tion of the displays’ messages, rather than on the meaning of the messages 
themselves.35 In Summum, the Supreme Court rejected the free speech claim 
of a religious group seeking to have its permanent monument displayed 
alongside the Ten Commandments and various more obviously secular 
items in a publicly owned park known as Pioneer Park.36 The Court held 
that the monuments in the park, while uniformly donated by private parties, 
were government speech and therefore immune to claims of discriminatory 
treatment from a free speech perspective.37 In Buono, a National Park Ser-
vice employee challenged the presence on federal land of a Latin cross, 
which served as a memorial to the soldiers who had died in World War I.38 
Although there was no majority opinion in that case, the Court held against 
the cross’s challenger.39 A plurality opined that federal legislation transfer-
ring ownership of the cross to a private party, passed after the district court 
  
 33 See, e.g., Summum, 555 U.S. at 469. 
 34 This Article borrows the term “endorsement/equality” from Professor Martha Nussbaum. Pro-
fessor Nussbaum refers to the “equality/endorsement framework” as the approach that is usually applied 
by the Court in Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause cases dealing with school prayer and 
religious symbolism displays; this Article extends the term to encompass public-forum free speech cases 
as well. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION 
OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 260-72 (2008). 
 35 See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1816-17 (2010) (plurality opinion); Summum, 555 U.S. 
at 472. 
 36 Summum, 555 U.S. at 465. 
 37 Id. at 473-74.  
 38 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1811-12. 
 39 Id. at 1816-17. 
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found an Establishment Clause violation, had the potential to alleviate a 
previously adjudicated constitutional violation.40  
In some ways, these cases are quite distinct and may even be consid-
ered mirror images of one another.41 In Summum, which did not directly 
deal with an Establishment Clause challenge,42 the Government claimed the 
purportedly religious speech as its own and thereby deflected any argument 
that it had behaved in a discriminatory manner with respect to the variety of 
speakers seeking to have their symbols displayed in the park.43 In Buono, by 
contrast, the Government’s strategy was to disown the allegedly religious 
speech by transferring title to a private party, thereby deflecting the claim 
that the Government had endorsed the religious message of the Latin 
cross.44 
Yet, the two cases have a number of things in common as well. First, 
of course, the challengers lost in both cases.45 And, in holding for the gov-
ernmental entity seeking to exclude a private religious speaker in both in-
stances, the Court embraced the language of property, focusing on owner-
ship and control of the challenged speech.46 In both cases, the Court ulti-
mately resolved the controversy against the plaintiffs by placing the reli-
gious speech into a framework in which the speaker has the virtually unlim-
ited right to exclude any kind of speech for any kind of reason and is not 
subject to requirements of neutrality.47 In other words, the Court found in 
both cases that the ownership of the religious speech—private ownership in 
one case and government ownership in the other—rendered the Govern-
ment immune from claims of religious discrimination.48  
  
 40 Id. at 1814-15. 
 41 Cf. Tebbe, supra note 29, at 71 (“One of these cases, then, asks whether government can avoid 
a constitutional difficulty by publicizing private sectarian speech, while the other asks whether govern-
ment can evade a different constitutional problem by privatizing such expression.”). 
 42 Although the Supreme Court alluded to the Establishment Clause implications of its holding, 
the plaintiffs had not raised a federal Establishment Clause claim, choosing instead to rely solely on the 
Free Speech Clause. Summum, 555 U.S. at 466. As Professor Bernadette Meyler explains, plaintiff 
Summum initially raised a claim under the Utah Constitution’s anti-establishment provisions but did not 
pursue that claim in the litigation, and it was deemed waived by the Tenth Circuit. Bernadette Meyler, 
Summum and the Establishment Clause, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 95, 98-99 (2009). Summum 
subsequently amended its complaint to include an Establishment Clause claim, which was dismissed by 
the district court. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, No. 2:05CV638 DAK, 2010 WL 2330336, at *4 (D. 
Utah June 3, 2010). 
 43 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 467. 
 44 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1814. 
 45 Id. at 1811; Summum, 555 U.S. at 466. 
 46 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1818-19; Summum, 555 U.S. at 473-74. 
 47 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1818-19; Summum, 555 U.S. at 473-74. 
 48 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1818-19; Summum, 555 U.S. at 473-74. 
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A. The Endorsement-Equality Framework 
Although the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
concerning religious symbolism is famously messy and widely criticized, 
some general principles can be derived from it.49 Above all, the analysis has 
focused on the social meaning of a given display and specifically on the 
question whether that display conveyed a message of endorsement of a par-
ticular religion, or of religion in general, thereby suggesting that nonadher-
ents are social and political outsiders.50 This analysis is embodied in the so-
called “endorsement test,” and it is—for the time being, at least—the pre-
dominant approach to evaluating the constitutionality of religious symbol-
ism displays.51 Even when the Court has declined to apply the endorsement 
test in a given religious symbolism case, however, a majority of the Justices 
still sought to resolve the central question that the endorsement test also 
seeks to address—namely, the social meaning of the display to a reasonable 
observer, viewed in its physical, temporal, and historical context.52 
To date, the Supreme Court has not had as much opportunity to con-
sider free speech challenges to the exclusion of religious symbols from pub-
lic fora.53 Nonetheless, it has developed a body of doctrine holding with 
great clarity that governmental entities may not discriminate against reli-
gious speech simply because of its religious, even devotional, character.54 
And in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,55 involving the 
placement of a Latin cross by the Ku Klux Klan in a public square near the 
seat of government, the Court made it clear both that the Free Speech 
Clause required, and the Establishment Clause did not prohibit, equal ac-
cess to public fora for those seeking to erect religious displays.56 The ani-
mating principle in all of those cases was a prohibition on discrimination 
  
 49 See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. 
REV. 713, 719-20 (2001); B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique 
of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 493-95 (2005) (arguing that the endorsement test in its 
current application reflects certain difficulties that are inherent to any inquiry into social meaning but 
that the test ultimately asks the right questions); William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”: 
The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 536-37 (1986); Steven D. Smith, Sym-
bols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 
86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 276-301 (1987). 
 50 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and 
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 
512 (1993). 
 51 See 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 88 (2008) (noting that a majority 
of the Justices “ha[ve] treated the [endorsement] inquiry as central only in the public display cases”). 
 52 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691-92 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J.). 
 53 See discussion infra Part I.A.2. 
 54 See discussion infra Part I.A.2. 
 55 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 56 Id. at 766. 
370 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 20:2 
against speech based on its religious viewpoint, both in public fora and in 
those spaces characterized as limited public fora.57 
1. The Endorsement-Social Meaning Framework in Establishment 
Clause Cases 
The endorsement-social meaning framework first arose in Justice San-
dra Day O’Connor’s Lynch v. Donnelly concurrence, in which she formu-
lated the endorsement test.58 Though she ultimately agreed with the majori-
ty’s decision to uphold the display of a nativity scene in a privately owned 
park at Christmastime, she famously asserted that the proper inquiry in such 
cases is whether, by symbolically endorsing religion, the challenged gov-
ernmental action “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, 
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying mes-
sage to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.”59 The newly minted endorsement test then garnered the sup-
port of a majority of Justices, though in a set of badly fractured decisions, in 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU.60 That case involved a challenge to two dif-
ferent displays—a crèche and a menorah—both of which were owned by 
private groups and situated on government property.61 The Court upheld the 
menorah display but found the crèche unconstitutional, with members of 
the concurrence and dissents reaching different conclusions but agreeing on 
the applicability of the endorsement test.62 
Though the endorsement test appeared to provide some structure for 
the constitutional inquiry when religious displays were at issue, it did not 
take long for cracks to appear in its already-fragile façade.63 The endorse-
ment test fell from prominence—but without disappearing entirely—in two 
companion cases decided in 2005, dealing with challenges to displays of the 
Ten Commandments on government-owned property.64 In McCreary Coun-
ty v. ACLU, the Court declared the displays, which had been erected by the 
local government inside county courthouses, unconstitutional as motivated 
  
 57 Id. at 761. 
 58 See generally Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 59 Id. at 688. 
 60 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989); see id. at 623-37 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 637-46 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); id. at 646-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 655-79 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 61 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579, 587 (majority opinion). 
 62 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 63 The cracks were already evident by the fractured nature of the Allegheny opinion. See supra 
text accompanying note 60. 
 64 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850-51 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 
681-82 (2005). 
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by a religious purpose.65 In so doing, the Court applied the alternative Es-
tablishment Clause test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.66 In looking to 
Lemon, the Court chose an alternative test, but one affiliated with the en-
dorsement test.67 Moreover, the Court showed itself still to be concerned 
with the social meaning of the display. Invoking the language of the en-
dorsement test, the Court noted that “[t]he reasonable observer could only 
think that the [c]ounties meant to emphasize and celebrate the Command-
ments’ religious message” when they mounted their initial Ten Command-
ments displays, and, given the counties’ continuing religious purpose, de-
clined to find that this fact had been changed by the subsequent displays.68 
Finally, in Van Orden, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Ten 
Commandments display, which had been donated forty years earlier by a 
private entity, on the Texas statehouse grounds.69 Although there was no 
majority rationale for upholding the display,70 a majority of the Justices 
applied the endorsement test, or its substantial equivalent, in determining 
that the overall meaning of the Ten Commandments display was secular 
rather than religious.71  
Thus, although the Justices have regularly divided over both the result 
and the precise doctrinal test for evaluating the constitutionality of religious 
symbolism, one relatively constant principle has been that a majority of 
Justices have focused on the social meaning of the display, as perceived by 
the so-called “reasonable observer.”72 In some instances the religious sym-
bol was privately owned and in some instances it was government-owned, 
  
 65 Id. at 850-51, 858. 
 66 Id. at 859-61 (applying the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). 
 67 See, e.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 866 (describing the purpose inquiry of the Lemon test 
in terms drawn from the endorsement test and citing cases that have applied the endorsement test). 
 68 Id. at 855, 869, 869-73. 
 69 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681-82 (2005). 
 70 As Kent Greenawalt explains, in Van Orden and McCreary, eight Justices thought the cases 
should come out the same way, though they didn’t agree on how. Only Justice Breyer saw a difference 
between the two cases, and he therefore cast the swing vote. GREENAWALT, supra note 51, at 86. His 
opinion, joined by no one, also provides the relevant rationale for the case, as it provides the narrowest 
ground supporting the decision. See, e.g., Paul E. McGreal, Social Capital in Constitutional Law: The 
Case of Religious Norm Enforcement Through Prayer at Public Occasions, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 585, 619 
n.156 (2008). 
 71 Hill, supra note 49, at 502 (stating that Justice Breyer “analyzed the display in light of the 
physical and historical context in order to determine whether a religious or secular message was con-
veyed—an analysis that is functionally equivalent to the endorsement inquiry”); McGreal, supra note 
70, at 619 n.156 (noting that four Justices in dissent applied the endorsement test). Justice Breyer did not 
claim to be applying any particular test but rather to be using “legal judgment”; in addition to the con-
textual factors, the divisiveness that would be caused by tearing down the monument, as opposed to the 
relative lack of divisiveness that the monument had caused during the forty years it had stood there, 
seemed to play an important role for Justice Breyer. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concur-
ring). 
 72 See McGreal, supra note 70, at 619-20. 
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but the ownership of, or control over, the symbol itself never appeared to 
make any difference to the Court’s analysis.73 As described above, the dis-
plays in Allegheny were privately owned but placed in publicly owned 
spaces.74 In Van Orden, the challenged display had been donated to the 
government by a private group and placed in a publicly owned park.75 
Though the provenance of the displays in McCreary is unclear, at the time 
of the lawsuits the government controlled them and they were located in 
public buildings.76 Finally, the display in Lynch was owned by the govern-
ment, but placed in a privately owned park.77 
2. The Equality-Nondiscrimination Framework in Free Speech 
Cases 
In Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, the Supreme 
Court addressed for the first time the free speech rights of those seeking to 
place a religious symbol in a public forum.78 In Pinette, the Ku Klux Klan 
claimed that the City of Columbus, Ohio had discriminated against it, 
thereby violating the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, by refus-
ing to allow it to place a large Latin cross in Capitol Square, a public plaza 
situated near the seat of government.79 The city had claimed it was not dis-
criminating against the Klan’s message but rather had declined the symbol 
for fear of violating the Establishment Clause.80 The question before the 
Court was therefore “whether a State violates the Establishment Clause 
when, pursuant to a religiously neutral state policy, it permits a private par-
ty to display an unattended religious symbol in a traditional public forum 
located next to its seat of government.”81  
  
 73 See generally Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691-92 (failing to discuss ownership of the symbol in its 
analysis); McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 881 (failing to consider ownership of the symbol in its analy-
sis); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 600 (1989) (stating explicitly that private ownership 
did not alter the Court’s analysis). 
 74 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579. 
 75 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681-82. 
 76 None of the published opinions in McCreary discusses the counties’ acquisitions of the Ten 
Commandments in any detail. See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 861; ACLU v. McCreary County, 145 
F. Supp. 2d 845, 846 (E.D. Ky. 2001), aff’d, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), aff’d 545 U.S. 844 (2005); 
ACLU v. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 684 (E.D. Ky. 2000); Doe v. Harlan Cnty. Sch. Dist., 
96 F. Supp. 2d 667, 670-71 (E.D. Ky. 2000). 
 77 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (“Each year, in cooperation with the downtown 
retail merchants’ association, the city of Pawtucket, R.I., erects a Christmas display as part of its ob-
servance of the Christmas holiday season. The display is situated in a park owned by a nonprofit organi-
zation and located in the heart of the shopping district.”). 
 78 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 759 (1995). 
 79 Id. at 758-59. 
 80 Id. at 759-60. 
 81 Id. at 757. 
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Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, began by articulating the 
now-uncontroversial proposition that “private religious speech, far from 
being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free 
Speech Clause as secular private expression.”82 He then cited the body of 
precedent establishing the norm of equality and nondiscrimination with 
respect to religious speech in public and limited public fora.83 Indeed, the 
Court has long held that it constitutes unconstitutional content- or view-
point-based discrimination to treat religious speech—whether in the form of 
worship, prayer, or speech from a religious perspective—less favorably 
than secular speech.84 
In addressing the Establishment Clause issue, however, Justice Scalia 
represented only a plurality of the Justices.85 Perhaps foreshadowing the 
property-focused approach that would soon come to dominate the Court’s 
case law, his opinion advocated for a per se rule that private religious 
speech in a true and properly administered public forum cannot violate the 
Establishment Clause.86 Justice Scalia thus dismissed concerns about “mis-
taken” perceptions of endorsement by observers seeing an unattended cross 
in such close proximity to the seat of government.87 Instead, he focused 
primarily on the nature of the forum and the access to it, as well as the pub-
lic or private nature of the speech rather than on the message conveyed.88 
He thus dismissed “[t]he test petitioners propose, which would attribute to a 
neutrally behaving government private religious expression.”89 
Yet, Justice Scalia’s proposed categorical approach did not win out.90 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, joined by Justices David Souter and Ste-
phen Breyer, persisted in applying an endorsement analysis.91 While noting 
that it was unlikely that private religious speech in a true public forum 
could be perceived as an endorsement of religion, Justice O’Connor’s opin-
  
 82 Id. at 760 (citing Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); 
Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 
454 U.S. 263 (1981); Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981)). 
 83 Id. at 761. 
 84 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107-09 (2001) (holding that 
exclusion of a religious children’s organization from use of school property on the same terms as other 
groups constituted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-35 (1995) (holding that denial of funding to religious student publica-
tion by a public university constituted viewpoint discrimination); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-70 (holding 
exclusion of student groups from using school property for religious worship and discussion to be un-
constitutional content-based discrimination). 
 85 See Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 770. The plurality was composed of Justice Scalia, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and Thomas. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 766, 770. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 763-64 (citations omitted). 
 90 See id. at 757. 
 91 Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 777 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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ion declined to sign on to a per se rule and maintained a focus on the mes-
sage actually conveyed to the reasonable observer by the display, given its 
overall context.92 Even when private speech in a public forum is involved, 
Justice O’Connor argued, an endorsement effect may still arise in some 
circumstances, “whether because of the fortuity of geography, the nature of 
the particular public space, or the character of the religious speech at issue, 
among others.”93 
Thus, although the result in Capitol Square might suggest that issues 
of ownership and the private or public nature of the speech were central to 
the Establishment Clause analysis, in fact a majority of the Justices still 
perceived a different fundamental question.94 They considered whether the 
privately owned cross, situated in a public forum, conveyed a message of 
endorsement of religion in light of its physical setting, proximity to the seat 
of government, and lack of disclaimer and accompanying secular symbol-
ism.95 Capitol Square may be viewed as a transitional case that foreshadows 
the decisions and the paradigm shift in Summum and Buono, but one that 
nonetheless remains firmly planted in the endorsement/equality framework. 
B. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, Salazar v. Buono, and the Turn to 
Property 
The decisive shift toward the property framework began with Sum-
mum. Although the Court’s unanimous holding—that the religious group 
Summum did not have a Free Speech right to install its monument among 
other permanent monuments in a city-owned park—likely surprised no one, 
  
 92 Justice O’Connor suggested that, because the “reasonable observer” is presumed to be aware 
that the forum is a traditional public forum, open to all comers, he or she would not perceive an en-
dorsement of religion in the City’s decision to allow the Klan to use the space on the same terms as all 
other groups. Id. at 775-77, 780-82. 
 93 Id. at 778. Though Justice O’Connor did not give any examples of what she meant when she 
suggested that an inference of endorsement could still arise in a true public forum, one might imagine a 
case in which, for example, a religious group operating in a public forum includes the city seal on its 
religious symbols, thereby suggesting an official imprimatur. Cf. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 
F.3d 1095, 1121 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting as one factor in finding the Establishment Clause violated by 
the placement of Latin crosses on public land—though not in a public forum—that each “cross conspic-
uously bears the imprimatur of a state entity”), cert. denied sub nom. Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. 
Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011). 
  In Capitol Square, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented on the grounds that the cross’s 
location, lack of a disclaimer attributing its message to a private group, and proximity to key govern-
ment buildings conveyed a message of religious endorsement, notwithstanding the nature of the Capitol 
Square forum. 515 U.S. at 800-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 94 See id. at 776, 778 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 785 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 800-02 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 95 See id. at 776, 778 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 785 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 800-02 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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the Court’s rationale appeared less foreordained.96 Somewhat controversial-
ly, and one might even say implausibly, the Court held that the privately 
donated monuments in the public park constituted government speech, 
thereby rendering the City doctrinally immune from claims of viewpoint 
discrimination in its selection of monuments.97  
A small religious group brought the Summum lawsuit, seeking to place 
a permanent stone monument in a public park (Pioneer Park) in Pleasant 
Grove City, Utah.98 As in Van Orden, the park already contained a Ten 
Commandments monument donated decades earlier by the Fraternal Order 
of Eagles, along with a number of permanent secular monuments.99 The 
Summum group wished to add its “Seven Aphorisms of SUMMUM,” 
which were roughly its equivalent of the Ten Commandments, to be “simi-
lar in size and nature to the Ten Commandments monument.”100 When the 
City refused the donation, the group asserted a violation of its free speech 
rights, claiming that the City had engaged in viewpoint discrimination by 
refusing to permit the group’s expression in a public forum.101 In response, 
the City maintained that the monuments in the park were its own speech—
“government speech”—and therefore immune to such claims.102 Though the 
Summum group had achieved an initial victory in the Tenth Circuit, ulti-
mately the Supreme Court sided with the defendant City, embracing its 
government-speech rationale.103 
The label of government speech serves as a defense to a free speech 
claim.104 If the government is expressing its own message rather than 
providing a forum for private speech, the doctrine holds, then it has leeway 
to exclude or discriminate against private messages in any way it sees fit.105 
Thus, the government assumes the role of a private speaker and is free from 
the rules against content- and viewpoint-based discrimination that apply 
  
 96 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Grapple with Question of Church Monument as Free Speech 
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2008, at A24 (stating that the oral argument questioning was “not a good 
sign for Summum”); Chris Lund, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, PRAWFSBLAWG (Nov. 10, 2008, 
12:06 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/11/pleasant-grove.html (“I think the smart 
money is on Summum losing.”). 
 97 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009). 
 98 Id. at 465-66. 
 99 Id. at 464-65. 
 100 Id. at 465. 
 101 Id. at 466. 
 102 Id. at 467. 
 103 Summum, 555 U.S. at 464. 
 104 See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment Clause, 85 
TUL. L. REV. 571, 573 (2011) (“If the speech is government speech . . . the Free Speech Clause does not 
apply.”). 
 105 Id. 
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when it acts as regulator.106 No government could do its job, after all, unless 
it is able to express its views on matters like foreign policy or public health, 
without having to provide a platform for opposing views at every turn. The 
government may, and indeed must, exercise dominion and control over its 
own message. Of course, the fact that government speech is immune from 
claims of viewpoint discrimination does not mean that it is protected from 
claims that it violates other constitutional prohibitions—such as the Estab-
lishment Clause.107 The Establishment Clause was not, however, directly 
relevant in the Summum case because the plaintiff had not pressed an Estab-
lishment Clause claim.108 
In holding that the monuments in the park constituted government 
speech, the Court in Summum adopted an analytic framework centered on 
concepts of sovereignty, ownership, and property.109 More striking, this 
holding placed the governmental defendant in the role of private property 
owner. In transforming the central controversy in the case from a free 
speech issue into, essentially, a property issue, the Court was able to short-
circuit the free speech claim.110 Having determined that the speech belonged 
to the government, the Court had automatically resolved the free speech 
issue. But putting the government in the place of the private property owner 
appears to ignore completely any claim that the public itself has to the land. 
Indeed, government speech doctrine itself tends to place the govern-
ment in the position of a private party—that is, of an employer, market par-
ticipant, and exerciser of private law rights to control property and exclude 
others. For example, the government speech cases describe the government 
as “raising [its] voice in the ‘marketplace of ideas.”111 Following this para-
digm, Justice Samuel Alito’s majority opinion in Summum repeatedly refers 
to the city as a “property owner”112 and notes that it “took ownership”113 of 
the various monuments in the park.  
Moreover, the Court expressly linked the City’s ownership of the 
monument not so much to expression of a message as to the City’s very 
  
 106 Id. at 577; Joseph Blocher, Property and Speech in Summum, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
83, 89 (2009) (“[W]hen the government speaks . . . , it has a near-absolute right to control its mes-
sage.”). 
 107 See, e.g., Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 367-68 
(2009). 
 108 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 109 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470-74, 476 (2009). 
 110 See Tebbe, supra note 29, at 72 (describing Summum as a case in which the government “suc-
cessfully insulated itself from a constitutional challenge through actions involving a property transfer”). 
 111 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). Of course, 
the “marketplace of ideas” is a familiar trope, but as Professor Blocher notes, the language of a speech 
market nonetheless implies concepts of privatization and rivalrousness. Blocher, supra note 106, at 91. 
 112 See, e.g., Summum, 555 U.S. at 471 (using the term three times in one paragraph to refer to the 
city, albeit in the abstract). 
 113 Id. at 473. 
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identity.114 “[T]he City took ownership of [the Ten Commandments] mon-
ument and put it on permanent display in a park that it owns and manages 
and that is linked to the City’s identity. All rights previously possessed by 
the monument’s donor have been relinquished,” Justice Alito explained.115 
Yet, in assuming the City’s possession of the monument to be an expressive 
act, the Court was again placing the government in the exact position of a 
private property owner. If a private individual or organization takes owner-
ship of a monument and displays it, it is reasonable to assume that the act 
expresses something about the owner’s views. The government is not usual-
ly in the same position, however, given that it often holds land in public 
trust, for public use, and possibly for expression of the public’s views, with 
which the government may or may not agree.116 It simply makes no sense to 
analogize the government’s relationship to the monuments in a public park 
to the relationship of a private property owner to the expressive objects he 
or she displays. 
At the same time, the Court downplayed the meaning of the Ten 
Commandments monument itself, as it questioned the determinacy of such 
messages with almost postmodern zeal—even going so far as to place the 
word “message” in scare quotes: 
Respondent seems to think that a monument can convey only one “message” . . . . This ar-
gument fundamentally misunderstands the way monuments convey meaning. . . . Even when 
a monument features the written word, the monument may be intended to be interpreted, and 
may in fact be interpreted by different observers, in a variety of ways. . . . Contrary to re-
spondent’s apparent belief, it frequently is not possible to identify a single “message” that is 
conveyed by an object or structure . . . .117 
Justice Alito’s opinion thus sidelines the issue of the Ten Commandments’ 
possibly exclusionary meaning by simply treating it as indeterminate. 
Some of the Justices recognized that the category of government 
speech—with the proprietary and exclusionary dimensions that it implies—
was a poor fit with the type of expressive activity involved in the Summum 
case.118 Justice John Paul Stevens asserted that “the reasons justifying the 
city’s refusal [of the monument] would have been equally valid if its ac-
ceptance of the monument, instead of being characterized as ‘government 
  
 114 Indeed, Professor Mary Jean Dolan refers to such monuments as governmental “identity 
speech.” Mary Jean Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion: Establishment Clause Limits after 
Summum, 19 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 4 (2010) [hereinafter Dolan, Government Identity Speech]; 
see also Mary Jean Dolan, Why Monuments Are Government Speech: The Hard Case of Pleasant Grove 
City v. Summum, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 7, 26-30 (2008). 
 115 Summum, 555 U.S. at 473-74. 
 116 The author is indebted to Dave Fagundes for raising this point. 
 117 Summum, 555 U.S. at 474, 476. 
 118 See Blocher, supra note 106, at 92. 
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speech,’ had merely been deemed an implicit endorsement of the donor’s 
message.”119 Likewise, Justice Souter suggested that  
[t]o avoid relying on a per se rule to say when speech is governmental, the best approach that 
occurs to me is to ask whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would understand 
the expression to be government speech, as distinct from private speech the government 
chooses to oblige by allowing the monument to be placed on public land.120 
Those concurring opinions, while supporting the result, nonetheless demon-
strate a discomfort with the property-based approach that the majority’s 
rhetoric suggested, preferring to consider ownership as merely a factor rel-
evant to the endorsement inquiry. 
The Court’s property-as-exclusion focus continued in its next religious 
symbolism case—this time, a seemingly more straightforward Establish-
ment Clause challenge. In Buono, a retired National Park Service employee, 
Frank Buono, brought an Establishment Clause challenge to a Latin cross 
that was initially erected by private individuals acting unofficially and 
without permission at Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve.121 
Buono brought his challenge after another individual sought to have a Bud-
dhist shrine placed on the same site but was denied permission by the Gov-
ernment.122  
The rather byzantine procedural history of Buono may account to 
some degree for the strange configuration of the Justices’ opinions in that 
case. Buono’s claim initially succeeded on summary judgment in 2002 be-
fore the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, resulting 
in an injunction requiring the cross to be dismantled.123 During the penden-
cy of that litigation and prior to the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of the district 
court’s decision, however, Congress had intervened in various ways with 
the ostensible purpose of keeping the cross from being dismantled: first, by 
passing two separate appropriations provisions that forbade the expenditure 
of public funds for the removal of the cross; second, by designating the 
cross a national memorial; and third, by passing a statute transferring the 
land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in exchange for another privately-
owned parcel of land elsewhere in the National Preserve.124 Despite the land 
transfer, the Government retained a measure of control over the land, in that 
  
 119 Summum, 555 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 120 Id. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter also noted that “[t]his reasonable observer test 
for governmental character is of a piece with the one for spotting forbidden governmental endorsement 
of religion in the Establishment Clause cases.” Id. 
 121 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1812 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 122 Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008) (McKeown, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc), rev’d sum nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S.Ct 1803 (2010). 
 123 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1812. The Ninth Circuit stayed the requirement of dismantling the cross, 
however, and allowed the Government to cover it instead. Id. at 1812-13. 
 124 Id. at 1813. 
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it would revert back to Government ownership if it ceased being maintained 
as a war memorial.125  
The Government did not petition for certiorari after the Ninth Circuit 
also decided in Buono’s favor.126 In the course of affirming, however, the 
Ninth Circuit had not addressed the relevance, if any, of the congressional 
land transfer statute on the Establishment Clause holding.127 Thus, Buono 
returned to the district court and sought to prevent the land transfer by ask-
ing the district court either to hold that the transfer violated the 2002 injunc-
tion or to modify that injunction to forbid the transfer.128 The district court 
did the former, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed again.129 The Government 
then successfully sought certiorari.130 
The controversy before the district court on remand from the Ninth 
Circuit, after the land transfer statute, had seemed to center around the rela-
tively straightforward question whether the proposed transfer was a sham, 
intended to avoid the force of the initial injunction, or instead was a valid 
remedy for the Establishment Clause violation.131 Applying a series of fac-
tors based on other lower courts’ encounters with this precise issue, the 
appellate court held that the circumstances of the particular sale at issue in 
Buono indicated that it was an attempt to evade the court’s ruling and there-
fore that the transfer should be blocked.132  
The Supreme Court plurality’s understanding of the problem before it 
was entirely different, however.133 Instead of ruling on the validity of the 
land transfer, it assumed the transfer as a sort of fait accompli and then in-
structed the lower court to decide whether the fact of the symbol’s presence 
on private property affected the Establishment Clause analysis.134 To this 
inquiry, it appeared, the plurality expected the answer to be “yes.”135 In oth-
er words, the plurality treated the ownership or attribution of the symbol as 
the decisive factor in the case; rather than asking whether the Government’s 
  
 125 Id. 
 126 Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 127 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1813. 
 128 Id. at 1813-14. 
 129 Id. at 1814. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1178 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Buono v. 
Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). 
 132 Id. at 1179-82; see Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2005); 
Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002); Freedom from Religion Found. v. 
City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2000); see generally Paul Forster, Note, Separating 
Church and State: Transfers of Government Land as Cures for Establishment Clause Violations, 85 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 401 (2010). 
 133 The plurality opinion was written by Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and 
joined in part by Justice Alito (who agreed with the entire opinion except the decision to remand). 
Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1811 (plurality opinion). 
 134 Id. at 1820. 
 135 Id. at 1819-20. 
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actions, taken as a whole, should be understood as an endorsement of reli-
gion in violation of the First Amendment, the plurality focused only on the 
ownership of the symbol.136 “The injunction was issued to address the im-
pression conveyed by the cross on federal, not private, land,” Justice An-
thony Kennedy’s opinion explained.137 The opinion then cited Summum for 
the notion that “‘[p]ersons who observe donated monuments routinely—and 
reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the property 
owner’s behalf.’”138 Thus, the Court remanded to the district court to recon-
sider its decision “in light of the change in law and circumstances effected 
by the land-transfer statute” and even questioned whether on remand the 
“reasonable observer” standard embodied in the endorsement test remained 
the proper one for analyzing the constitutionality of “objects on private 
land.”139  
Justice Scalia, who concurred in the judgment but felt that the case 
should have been decided on standing grounds instead, also focused on the 
ownership of the cross, rather than on its meaning.140 He opined that the 
Government could not be enjoined from “permitting” the display of the 
cross unless the Government owned the property on which it stood: 
Barring the Government from ‘permitting’ the cross’s display at a particular location makes 
sense only if the Government owns the location. As the proprietor, it can remove the cross 
that private parties have erected and deny permission to erect another. But if the land is pri-
vately owned, the Government can prevent the cross’s display only by making it illegal.141 
For at least a majority of the Justices, then, the most important fact in 
the case was the private rather than public ownership of the land on which 
the cross stood.142 Both Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion and Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence evidence an overriding concern with questions of 
ownership rather than with questions of meaning.143  
This shift in focus, and its concomitant marginalization of the en-
dorsement approach, troubled Justice Stevens, who authored the principal 
  
 136 Id. at 1819. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 471 (2009)). 
 139 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819, 1821. 
 140 Id. at 1824-25 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 141 Id. at 1825. As such, Buono could not show that he was injured by the Government’s land 
transfer, since had not shown that he was harmed or “offended” by the existence of the cross on private, 
rather than public, land. Id. at 1826-27. 
 142 Id. at 1819 (plurality opinion) (comprising the opinion of Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice 
Roberts); id. at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1825 (Scalia, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Thom-
as). 
 143 Id. at 1819 (plurality opinion) (comprising the opinion of Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice 
Roberts); id. at 1825 (Scalia, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Thomas). 
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dissent in the case.144 For Justice Stevens, the issue before the Supreme 
Court was essentially the same as the question that was at issue throughout 
the litigation: whether the Government’s actions—including the action of 
attempting to transfer the one-acre plot of land to a private party—resulted 
in an impermissible endorsement of religion.145 “In evaluating a claim that 
the Government would impermissibly ‘permit’ the cross’s display by effect-
ing a transfer,” Justice Stevens therefore explained, “a court cannot start 
from a baseline in which the cross has already been transferred.”146 In other 
words, Justice Stevens contended, the Court should not have based its deci-
sion merely on the public or private ownership at the time of decision.147 
Rather, it should have considered whether the transfer would cure or con-
tinue the already-adjudicated Establishment Clause violation.148  
Although Justice Stevens’s dissent did discuss the cross’s ownership, 
along with the indicia of continuing governmental control over the cross 
despite its transfer, he considered those facts only insofar as they were rele-
vant to an understanding of the social meaning of the Government’s ac-
tions.149 Thus, he argued that once the cross had been designated a national 
memorial, “changing the identity of the owner of the underlying land could 
no longer change the public or private character of the cross. The Govern-
ment has expressly adopted the cross as its own.”150 And of course, what the 
Government has adopted is a religious message: “We have recognized the 
significance of the Latin cross as a sectarian symbol, and no participant in 
this litigation denies that the cross bears that social meaning. Making a 
plain, unadorned Latin cross a war memorial does not make the cross secu-
lar. It makes the war memorial sectarian.”151 Justice Stevens distinguished 
  
 144 Id. at 1828-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor). Justice 
Breyer dissented separately on the ground that the case involved no substantial constitutional issues but 
rather revolved around the simple question of whether the district court had the power to interpret its 
own injunction as it did and to enforce that injunction as it saw fit—a question of the law of remedies. 
Id. at 1842-44. According to Justice Breyer, that question clearly should have been answered in the 
affirmative. Id. at 1845. 
 145 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 146 Id. at 1831. 
 147 Id. at 1841. 
 148 Id. at 1837. An analogous case to Buono is Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), in which 
the Supreme Court held that the decision by the City of Jackson, Mississippi to close its public swim-
ming pools rather than to operate them on a racially integrated basis did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 219. The Court decided that the City’s decision to close the 
pools and even to transfer at least one of them to a private entity, to be operated on a segregated basis, 
did not implicate the City itself in any racially discriminatory action; thus, the private ownership of the 
pools became the dispositive factor. Id. at 222-23. Justice White’s dissent in that case, by contrast, 
argued that the closing and the transfer of the pools should be viewed in a broader context, taking into 
account the City’s apparent discriminatory motivations. Id. at 254-55 (White, J., dissenting). 
 149 See, e.g., Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1834-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 150 Id. at 1834. 
 151 Id. at 1835 (footnotes omitted). 
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Pinette on the ground that the government action in that case, unlike in 
Buono, showed no favoritism toward religion.152 Because the contemplated 
private ownership of the patch of land in the national preserve was not a 
dispositive fact for Justice Stevens, he could ultimately conclude that 
“[c]hanging the ownership status of the underlying land . . . would not 
change the fact that the cross conveys a message of government endorse-
ment of religion.”153 
C. Summum and Buono Compared 
Summum and Buono treat distinct doctrinal issues. Summum was a free 
speech challenge, while Buono was an Establishment Clause case.154 As 
such, the principal question in Summum was whether the city park was a 
speech forum—and if so, what kind of forum—or whether it constituted 
government speech immune to Free Speech Clause attack.155 In Buono, by 
contrast, the issue was whether the cross display in the Mojave National 
Preserve impermissibly endorsed religion, in violation of the Establishment 
Clause.156 
But in several very important ways, Summum and Buono are closely 
related. At base, both cases arose out of an act of exclusion. In Summum, 
the challenge arose from the city’s exclusion of the Seven Aphorisms mon-
ument from its park, and in Buono, the government’s refusal to permit a 
Buddhist shrine to be erected at Sunrise Rock initially set in motion the 
litigation that ensued.157 Though one case was styled as a free speech case 
and the other as an Establishment Clause case, both concerned the govern-
ment’s ability to exclude some religious speech and to adopt other facially 
religious speech as its own.158 In addition, in both cases, the First Amend-
ment issues were resolved by reference to property and ownership, both 
literal and metaphorical, of symbolic speech.159 In Buono, the plurality 
viewed the actual ownership of the plot of land on which the cross stood as 
central to the case, and possibly dispositive of the Establishment Clause 
  
 152 Id. at 1836. 
 153 Id. at 1837. 
 154 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009); Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1812 (plurali-
ty opinion). 
 155 Summum, 555 U.S. at 464. 
 156 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1811-12 (plurality opinion). 
 157 Summum, 555 U.S. at 465; see also B. Jessie Hill, Property and the Public Forum: An Essay on 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 52 (2010). 
 158 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1834 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Summum, 555 U.S. at 473-74 (arguing that, 
although the City adopted ownership of the Ten Commandments monument, for instance, it did not 
thereby adopt a single meaning or symbolism for that monument). 
 159 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819 (plurality opinion); Summum, 555 U.S. at 470-72. 
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claim.160 In Summum, the city’s proprietary relationship to the Ten Com-
mandments monument and other monuments in Pioneer Park was also seen 
as directing the outcome of the case.161 In both literally and symbolically 
“owning” that speech, the city assumed the right to exclude Summum’s 
desired message from a public place.162 The central place that ownership 
occupies in these two cases is reflected, moreover, in the cases’ rhetoric, 
referring to the government with the privatizing term “property owner,” for 
example.163  
Finally, although in one case the Court was setting aside questions 
about endorsement and in the other it was setting aside questions about 
viewpoint discrimination, in both cases it used formalistic, conceptual rea-
soning to do so.164 In turning speech into a form of property and casting the 
government in the role of private property owner, the Court gave the gov-
ernment absolute power to control the constitutionality of its actions, mere-
ly by engaging in particular property transactions.165  
II. DOCTRINAL DEAD ENDS AND COUNTING HEADS: SOME POSSIBLE 
EXPLANATIONS FOR SUMMUM AND BUONO 
Each of the cases just discussed is somewhat idiosyncratic—Buono 
because of its convoluted history of property transactions and Summum 
because of its free speech posture that hints at but expressly disclaims an 
Establishment Clause problem.166 Despite their uniqueness, however, both 
the “government speech” category embraced in Summum and the property 
transfer remedy sanctioned in Buono may well have lives that extend be-
yond those individual cases. For instance, in a related context, Professor 
  
 160 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819 (plurality opinion). 
 161 Summum, 555 U.S. at 472-74. 
 162 Id. at 470-71. 
 163 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819 (plurality opinion) (“‘[P]ersons who observe donated monuments 
routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the property owner’s be-
half.’” (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 471)). 
 164 See, e.g., id. (treating the fact that the Latin cross stood on private land as virtually dispositive 
of the Establishment Clause); Summum, 555 U.S. at 481 (concluding that selecting certain monuments 
to include on public land is a form of government speech, not a form of censoring individuals’ free 
speech). 
 165 Cf. Zick, supra note 27, at 1396 (discussing several Establishment Clause cases involving 
settlement of constitutional issues through property disposition and reading the Buono plurality as giv-
ing “strong hints . . . that at least three [J]ustices are inclined to treat property dispositions deferentially, 
even in a case bearing some unusual indicia of favoritism toward a religious symbol”). 
 166 Buono involved a dispute over a land-transfer statute, which had permitted the government to 
grant the land where the cross stood to the Veterans of Foreign Wars and to receive private land to offset 
the value of the transferred land. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1813 (plurality opinion); see also Summum, 555 
U.S. at 482 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that although he agreed with the Court’s holding, the 
Court did not fully address the petitioner’s Establishment Clause claim). 
384 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 20:2 
Helen Norton has observed that lower courts have tended to take the Su-
preme Court’s broad understanding of public employee speech as govern-
ment speech set forth in Garcetti v. Ceballos167 and run with it, often apply-
ing it in factual settings where its relevance is less than obvious.168 In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez,169 rejecting a religious student group’s claims for inclusion among 
a public law school’s official sanctioned student organizations, may be un-
derstood as another iteration of the Court’s approach in Summum and Buo-
no. In that case, the Court applied the “limited-public-forum” doctrine to 
sideline the Christian Legal Society’s (“CLS”) free speech and free associa-
tion claims.170 The Court’s use of property concepts—particularly in its 
unprecedented application of forum doctrine to the CLS’s claim that the 
law school’s actions burdened its freedom of association—was not required 
by precedent, and it functioned to conceal or subsume difficult questions 
about the meanings of pluralism and equality by appearing to resolve the 
case on cut-and-dried private law concepts.171 
The primary focus of this Article is therefore on the troubling implica-
tions of importing property rhetoric into the case law dealing with religious 
symbolism. It is nonetheless helpful, in considering the future implications 
of Summum and Buono, to understand the possible reasons why the cases 
were decided as they were. 
The first and perhaps most obvious explanation for the configuration 
of the Supreme Court’s most recent religious symbolism cases is the re-
tirement of Justice O’Connor in 2006. Justice O’Connor was the creator and 
most fervent supporter of the endorsement test.172 Although O’Connor’s test 
managed to command a majority in the key religious symbolism cases, as 
the above discussion demonstrates, the majorities were fragile and frag-
mented, often composed of a mere five Justices, some of whom were writ-
ing in dissent.173 In the wake of O’Connor’s departure, commentators have 
  
 167 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 168 Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ 
Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2009) [hereinafter Norton, Constraining 
Public Employee Speech]; Helen Norton, Imaginary Threats to Government’s Expressive Interests, 61 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1265, 1267-68 (2011) [hereinafter Norton, Imaginary Threats]. 
 169 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 170 Id. at 2993-94. 
 171 Hill, supra note 157, at 51. 
 172 See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting 
Principles, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 137. 
 173 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-594 (1989); see id. at 623-37 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 637-646 (Brennan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); id. at 646-655 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 
655-679 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment, concurring in part, and dissenting in part); see also 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Future of Constitutional Law, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 647, 665 & n.126 (2006). 
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widely, if prematurely, pronounced the death of the endorsement test.174 
Justice O’Connor was, of course, replaced by Justice Alito, who wrote the 
majority opinion in Summum and who joined Justice Kennedy’s plurality 
opinion in Buono almost in its entirety.175 Thus, one might argue, the only 
thing that changed in any meaningful way between Van Orden and Sum-
mum was the Court personnel—but it was a change that, unsurprisingly, 
turned out to have significant implications for the ways in which Estab-
lishment Clause challenges would subsequently be decided.176 The dissents 
in Buono and concurrences in Summum, composed in part of those Justices 
who were formerly part of the majority applying the endorsement analysis 
in religious symbolism cases, thus persisted in focusing on questions of 
social meaning and the viewpoint of the reasonable observer rather than 
embracing the property law paradigm.177 
At the same time, it is somewhat surprising that the Court did not 
wholeheartedly adopt a coercion standard in Buono. As many commenta-
tors have observed, there are likely five votes for adopting Justice Kenne-
dy’s preferred, and more stringent, standard, according to which a govern-
ment action does not violate the Establishment Clause unless it constitutes 
(physical or psychological) coercion or proselytizing.178 That standard prob-
ably would have resulted in Buono being decided the same way, but it 
would have kept the focus of the Court’s inquiry on social meaning—
  
 174 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 173, at 665-66; Samaha, supra note 172, at 137; Gary J. 
Simson, Beyond Interstate Recognition in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 313, 
379-80 (2006). 
 175 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1821 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that he concurred with the majority 
in all but one respect); Lisa Shaw Roy, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: Monuments, Messages, and 
the Next Establishment Clause, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 280, 289 (2010). 
 176 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 173, at 664-66 (predicting that Justice O’Connor’s replace-
ment by Justice Alito was likely to make a difference in Establishment Clause cases); cf. Roy, supra 
note 175, at 289 (“Nor should it be lost on the reader that the author of the majority opinion in Summum, 
Justice Alito, assumed Justice O’Connor’s seat on the Court, which has both symbolic and practical 
implications.”). Of course, Chief Justice Rehnquist was also replaced by Chief Justice Roberts during 
the period between Van Orden and Summum, but that change did not appear to have any meaningful 
impact on the pattern of decision making in religious symbolism cases. 
 177 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1830-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor) (arguing that the plurality should have considered whether the transfer of the land itself 
perpetuated the already-adjudicated Establishment Clause violation); see also Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481-82 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting, in an opinion joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, that the City’s acceptance of a monument could be viewed as implicit endorsement of the 
monument’s message); id. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring) (suggesting that the relevant inquiry should 
focus on how the reasonable observer would attribute the speech). 
 178 See Chemerinsky, supra note 173, at 665 (opining that Justice Kennedy is one of five Justices 
likely in favor of “adopting a view that the government violates the Establishment Clause only if it 
literally establishes a church or coerces religious participation”); see also Simson, supra note 174, at 
379-81. 
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requiring the Court to ask whether the cross’s message was coercive or 
proselytizing—rather than on ownership.179 
A second pragmatic explanation for why these cases were decided as 
they were concerns the rather peculiar factual backdrops of both cases. The 
oddity of Summum lay in the religious sect’s request to be included in a 
public park not on a transient basis by means of an ephemeral speech or 
temporary holiday display, for example, but by being allowed to erect a 
large, permanent monument. The sheer practicalities of the situation—the 
unsavory possibility, if Summum’s request were granted, of opening up a 
public park to physical overcrowding by a cacophony of monuments—
seemed to dictate the result in that case.180 One might then speculate that the 
Court reached whatever doctrinal lengths were necessary in order to avoid 
this bizarre and counterintuitive result.181 And as noted above, the fact that 
the case arose as a Free Speech Clause challenge rather than in the usual 
Establishment Clause posture certainly accounted for the Court’s decision 
not to discuss questions of endorsement and social meaning in any direct 
way. Likewise, Buono was characterized by a complex and distracting fac-
tual and procedural history that both provided a number of alternate bases 
on which the case could be decided and made the determination of social 
meaning complex, to say the least. For this reason, a number of commenta-
tors predicted that the Supreme Court would decide the Buono case without 
seriously addressing the underlying Establishment Clause merits, which is 
exactly what it did.182 
Third, Summum and Buono can be seen as the end result of a doctrinal 
mess thirty years in the making. Ever since the Court first permitted reli-
gious speech in the public square, beginning with Lynch v. Donnelly’s sanc-
tioning of a crèche display at Christmastime, it seemed virtually inevitable 
that more and more religious voices would seek entry to that space, until 
  
 179 See generally B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and 
Change in Meaning over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705, 728 (2010) (discussing the relationship between the 
coercion test and the endorsement test); see also generally Mark Strasser, The Coercion Test: On Pray-
er, Offense, and Doctrinal Inculcation, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 417, 431-33 (2009) (discussing the coercion 
test as applied in the context of symbolic speech). 
 180 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 478-80 (referring to the space for different monuments in public 
parks as “limited”). 
 181 See Liptak, supra note 96 (noting that at oral argument “the [J]ustices were finding it hard to 
identify a principle that would compel the city to accept the Summum monument without creating havoc 
in public parks around the nation” and describing such questions asked by the Justices as, “‘You have a 
Statue of Liberty . . . . Do we have to have a statue of despotism? Or do we have to put any president 
who wants to be on Mount Rushmore?’” (quoting Chief Justice Roberts)). 
 182 The Buono plurality did not directly decide what implications the land transfer would have for 
the Establishment Clause claim but rather remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Buono, 
130 S. Ct. at 1820-21 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia felt that the case should have been decided on 
standing grounds, and Justice Breyer would have decided it as a matter of the law of remedies, not as a 
matter of constitutional law. Id. at 1824 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1842-43 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
2013] (DIS)OWNING RELIGIOUS SPEECH 387 
there was simply no more room.183 Once the First Amendment was under-
stood not to banish religious speech but simply to mandate equal treatment 
among speakers, one might argue, the flood of claims for equal treatment 
was inevitable.184 Thus, for example, in the years after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lynch, the Chabad-Lubavitch movement sought repeatedly to 
place menorah displays in prominent public places in various cities during 
the winter holiday season.185 A number of these displays became the subject 
of litigation; the most famous was the menorah in Allegheny, but several 
cases also involved Free Speech Clause challenges to the exclusion of me-
norahs from prominent public places.186 The Summum religion, too, fought 
and won on free speech grounds some cases involving access to public fo-
ra.187  
Summum thus represents a very concrete example of the crowding of 
the public sphere with religious voices demanding official recognition. But 
even in a less literally crowded public space, there are surely limits to the 
amount and types of religious speech a government is willing and able to 
include. There are only so many temporary holiday displays that can fit 
around the state capitol and only so many days on which a legislative pray-
er can be offered. Consequently, the Court had to reintroduce some bounda-
ries, either by means of the government speech doctrine, which would al-
low the government to repossess the public space and thereby prevent it 
  
 183 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 702 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (writing that, in the 
wake of the Court’s decision to permit a crèche to remain in a municipal display, “Jews and other non-
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IN BRIEF 43, 46 (2009). 
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 186 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); see also, e.g., Chabad of S. Ohio, 363 
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state capitol during the holiday season). But see Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt., 936 F.2d at 110-12 (uphold-
ing City of Burlington’s denial of a permit to displaying Chabad’s menorah in a city park, reasoning that 
the display would violate the Establishment Clause); Lubavitch Chabad House, 917 F.2d at 347-48 
(upholding the exclusion of Chabad’s menorah from O’Hare International Airport as a reasonable time, 
place, or manner restriction, despite the presence of city-owned Christmas trees). 
 187 See, e.g., Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1011 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
City of Ogden “cannot display the Ten Commandments Monument while declining to display the 
[Summum] Seven Principles Monument” consistent with the Free Speech Clause); Summum v. Calla-
ghan, 130 F.3d 906, 910, 921 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that Summum had stated a claim for denial of its 
free speech rights by being denied permission to erect its monolith on the county courthouse lawn 
alongside the Ten Commandments). 
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from being overcrowded with too many speakers, or by privatizing the 
property at issue, thereby cutting off the governmental connection to the 
alleged discrimination among speakers. In either case, a solution had to be 
found to allow some form of discrimination among, and exclusion of, reli-
gious voices, since including every religious speaker is simply impossible 
as a practical matter.188  
At the same time, as some commentators have observed, the govern-
ment’s ownership of religious speech creates a new problem—the appear-
ance that the government is endorsing that religious speech whenever it 
takes ownership of it.189 For this reason, it perhaps made sense for the Court 
to marginalize the endorsement test. In Summum, the Court suggested that 
there was a difference between government speech and government en-
dorsement of speech, by allowing that the government could be speaking 
through its monuments without speaking the actual words contained on the 
monuments.190 And in Buono, the Court allowed the government to avoid 
the implications of its ownership of a Latin cross by alienating that proper-
ty.191 Property law presented a way out of the doctrinal mess the Court itself 
had created. 
Finally, there is one more possibility that bears consideration: that the 
Supreme Court’s turn to property stemmed from a genuine desire to mini-
mize the conflict that arguably arises from or is aggravated by the endorse-
ment/equality approach to religious symbols.192 It seems that the level of 
emotional investment that attaches to cases involving religious symbolism, 
the intense criticism of the Court’s jurisprudence in this domain, and the 
volume of the debate concerning the constitutionality of religious symbols 
in public places has only increased rather than decreased since the Court 
entered the fray.193 As such, it would certainly be reasonable for the Court 
to believe that it only makes things worse when it issues pronouncements 
on the social meaning of religious symbols and whether they belong in the 
public square. Professor and former Judge Michael McConnell suggests, for 
example, that “cultural and political polarization” based on religion has 
increased in recent years, and that the Court may be “perceiv[ing] that pub-
lic passions are aroused more by the Supreme Court’s endorsement of one 
position and repudiation of the other than by the ostensible subjects of the 
dispute.”194 Indeed, McConnell further ventures that “few people care much 
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 191 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 192 The author is indebted to several people for encouraging her to examine this possibility, espe-
cially Jonathan Varat and Scott Burris. 
 193 See supra notes 4-12, 20, and accompanying text. 
 194 Michael W. McConnell, The Influence of Cultural Conflict on the Jurisprudence of the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment, in LAW AND RELIGION IN THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
100, 120, 122 (Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans & Zoë Robinson eds., 2008). 
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whether a seldom-seen monument on a county courthouse lawn contains a 
copy of the Ten Commandments, but many people care very much whether 
the Supreme Court says such a display is consistent with our constitutional 
values.”195 The use of property principles thus provides a convenient but 
still legally defensible way for the Court to avoid magnifying the cultural 
tensions provoked by religious symbolism cases: if it decides those cases on 
property grounds, it need not address difficult and contentious questions 
about the meaning of a particular symbol and how much government spon-
sorship of religious speech is too much for a pluralistic democracy to per-
mit. 
This last possibility—that the recent cases are an effort to lower the 
temperature of the debate—may well offer the best explanation for the 
Court’s decision making of late. As discussed at greater length below,196 
however, it is not a satisfying answer to the conundrum highlighted by this 
Article. Although the Court’s treatment of religious symbolism cases may 
aggravate disputes that began as marginal or minor, it cannot be said to 
have created them. The disputes reach the courts because parties bring them 
there. Though there is a danger that courts will only make matters worse in 
articulating legal resolutions to those disputes, there is also a danger that 
courts’ refusal to intervene or to make pronouncements regarding the con-
stitutional values that are truly at stake in a given case will simply render 
the harm arising from the display—the harm that gave rise to the plaintiff’s 
claim—all the more invisible. Though in some cases, perhaps, the turn to 
property may defuse the dispute with almost Solomonic cleverness, in some 
cases, no doubt, the harm, and the complaint it created, will be submerged 
but not eradicated. 
There are thus a number of pragmatic reasons that may explain why 
the Summum and Buono cases were decided as they were, making them 
unsurprising if ill-fitting additions to the sequence of religious symbolism 
cases in the Supreme Court. Even if predictable and in some sense justifia-
ble, however, the turn that the Court has taken in its rhetoric and reasoning 
has troubling implications. The following Section demonstrates that the 
property rhetoric of Summum and Buono is a particularly inappropriate 
overlay to Establishment Clause doctrine. 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE PRIVATE PROPERTY PARADIGM 
This Part presents a critique of the Court’s decision to embrace a par-
ticular version of property law and language in Summum and Buono—
modeled on the notion of private property as exclusion. Of course, to some 
degree, the concepts of property and ownership are always involved when a 
  
 195 Id. at 122. 
 196 See infra Part III.B.2. 
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legal challenge is presented to a religious display attributed to the govern-
ment. Therefore, Part III.A examines the relationship among the concepts 
of endorsement, attribution, and ownership, highlighting the way in which 
the Court’s opinion in Summum exploits the distinction between ownership 
and attribution in a way that favors the property perspective but undermines 
the goals of the government speech doctrine. 
Next, Part III.B considers in detail the reasons why it is unwise for the 
Court to adopt this particular version of property rhetoric and principles in 
the religious symbolism context. That Part argues that property law’s ap-
parent appeal as a neutral, clear, and formalistic approach to deciding diffi-
cult constitutional cases actually has very little to recommend it. Worse, the 
language of private-property-as-exclusion introduces into the doctrine a 
potential for legitimizing the subordination of minority religious speakers 
by the government. In addition, the government’s expressive possession of 
Christian religious symbols acts to construct the community as an openly 
Christian one, in which non-Christians and nonadherents are, at worst, un-
welcome outsiders and, at best, tolerated guests. 
A. Endorsement, Attribution, and Ownership 
The very concept of attribution, which itself is central to both the en-
dorsement analysis and the government speech defense, incorporates a no-
tion of ownership—or at a minimum, of control. A party cannot endorse a 
message without somehow claiming it as its own, usually by means of ex-
ercising some measure of ownership or control over the message. Whether 
one is attempting to discern endorsement or ownership, the issue appears to 
turn on the relationship to a symbolic object. The concepts are therefore 
closely affiliated. Indeed, although this Article argues that the Supreme 
Court’s turn to property in its religious symbolism cases is a relatively new 
phenomenon, it is also possible that the Court did not discuss the ownership 
of the symbolic speech in any meaningful way in older cases like Lynch, 
Allegheny, Van Orden, or McCreary because the symbol’s ownership—its 
attribution to the government—simply was not contested in those cases. 
This Section therefore explores in greater depth the relationship of owner-
ship to the concept of endorsement. Ultimately, while property rights and 
questions of ownership are inextricably linked with free speech concerns as 
well as Establishment Clause concerns pertaining to religious speech, own-
ership and endorsement are distinct concepts. The Court both recognized 
and exploited this distinction in Summum, with questionable results.197 
In applying the endorsement test to determine the constitutionality of a 
religious display, a court is required, implicitly, to make two determina-
tions: first, whether the display’s message endorses religion; and second, 
  
 197 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 473-74 (2009). 
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whether that message of religious endorsement can be attributed to the gov-
ernment.198 In early cases like Lynch and Allegheny, the focus was primarily 
on the first question.199 In Lynch and Allegheny, the Justices divided primar-
ily over their evaluation of the displays’ context and the social meaning 
they drew therefrom; the Court never stopped to question whether the 
crèche display in Lynch, for example, was attributable to the government of 
Pawtucket, Rhode Island, although it technically stood in a private park.200 
As one commentator has pointed out, the city owned the display itself and 
took responsibility for erecting and removing the display, thus exercising 
“effective control” over the display’s message.201 Indeed, the Court “has 
long resisted bright-line rules that would limit [the endorsement test’s] con-
textual analysis only to those messages that are government owned or con-
trolled.”202 Thus, the Court has clung to the endorsement test when a pri-
vately owned symbol stood on government property and when a publicly 
owned and erected display occupied private property.203  
In more recent years, however, the second question—the problem of 
attribution—has garnered significant scholarly attention, particularly in 
light of the rise of the government speech doctrine.204 In the wake of perco-
lating lower-court debates over the constitutionality of specialty license 
plate schemes as well as of the Summum case, much of this scholarship has 
focused on determining when the government should be able to claim 
speech as its own, thereby insulating that speech from challenge under the 
First Amendment’s free speech protections.205 Commentators have also 
considered when the government must take responsibility for speech, thus 
  
 198 Cf. Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra note 114, at 24 (“Establishment Clause claims in 
religious display cases generally require two conditions: a given display conveys a religious message, 
and the government (usually along with a private party) has some role.”). In theory, the Establishment 
Clause could also be violated by a message of governmental disapproval of religion. See, e.g., Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 199 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681, 683. 
 200 Haupt, supra note 104, at 606. 
 201 Id. at 606-07. 
 202 The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Leading Cases: Endorsement Test, 124 HARV. L. REV. 219, 
219 (2010). 
 203 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579, 597; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671, 682. In American Atheists, Inc. v. 
Davenport, the Tenth Circuit declined to hold that a privately owned Latin cross on private property 
bearing the symbol of a public agency was immune from Establishment Clause challenge simply by 
virtue of the private object-private land combination. 637 F.3d 1095, 1121 n.12 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied sub nom. Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011). 
 204 See, ex., Abner S. Greene, (Mis)attribution, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 833, 833 (2010); Haupt, supra 
note 104, at 594; Note, Three’s a Crowd—Defending the Binary Approach to Government Speech, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 805, 805 (2011) [hereinafter Three’s a Crowd]. 
 205 See, e.g., Haupt, supra note 104, at 575; Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: 
Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 591-92 (2008); Olree, supra note 107, at 373; 
Three’s a Crowd, supra note 204, at 805, 809. 
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opening itself to Establishment Clause challenges.206 Scholars such as Clau-
dia Haupt, Professor Helen Norton, and Professor Andy Olree have pro-
posed tests for identifying speech as governmental.207 Relatedly, Professor 
Caroline Mala Corbin has argued that courts should recognize a distinct 
category of “mixed speech,” which has elements of both private and gov-
ernmental control.208 In the analyses of these commentators, as well as of 
lower courts that have struggled to find a systematic approach to determin-
ing responsibility for speech, actual ownership of either the symbols or the 
property on which they stand is often a factor, but not a dispositive one.209 
Ownership and attribution, in other words, are related but not necessarily 
identical. 
Recent work by Professor Abner Greene, moreover, demonstrates that 
the relationship between a government “speaker” and a particular message 
may take a wide variety of forms.210 For example, sometimes the govern-
ment provides “platforms” for private speech with which it does not neces-
sarily wish to associate itself, but for which it appears to retain some re-
sponsibility.211 An example might be a specialty license plate program, or 
an adopt-a-highway program.212 In those instances, Professor Greene has 
argued that the government should have discretion to decline a platform for 
certain kinds of speech, such as speech that is hateful or vulgar; yet, the fact 
“[t]hat the state may be selectively advancing a contested view of the good 
does not entail that it is adopting the speech as its own, nor that it is correct 
to attribute the speech to the state.”213  
  
 206 Haupt, supra 104, at 572-73. 
 207 Haupt, supra note 104, at 575 (“effective control”); Norton, supra note 205, at 591-92; Olree, 
supra note 107, at 373. 
 208 Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 610 (2008). Professor Caroline Mala Corbin suggests that claims of viewpoint 
discrimination with respect to mixed speech should invoke intermediate scrutiny; she also implies that 
such speech would be attributable to the government for Establishment Clause purposes. Id. at 675-80 
(advocating for intermediate scrutiny); id. at 689-91 (stating that government may discriminate against 
mixed religious speech in order to avoid Establishment Clause problems). 
 209 For Claudia Haupt, ownership of the property may play a role in determining the entity to 
which a reasonable observer would attribute a religious message. She specifically eschews such “cate-
gorical” approaches in favor of an examination of “effective control.” Haupt, supra note 104, at 593-
601. Professor Helen Norton treats the public or private ownership of the property on which the speech 
occurs as a relevant “cue” to the proper attribution. Norton, supra note 205, at 608. Professor Andy 
Olree uses the ownership or control of the “medium or format” of the speech as one of three questions to 
ask in attributing speech. Olree, supra note 107, at 411. Professor Olree also notes that most lower 
courts have followed a four-pronged test for determining whether speech is governmental or private, and 
that actual ownership of the speech does not carry independent weight. Id. at 386, 398. 
 210 Abner S. Greene, Speech Platforms, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1253, 1253-54 (2011). 
 211 Id. at 1255-56. 
 212 Id. at 1257. 
 213 Id. at 1255; see also Greene, supra note 204, at 848. 
2013] (DIS)OWNING RELIGIOUS SPEECH 393 
This scholarship highlights the fact that the relationship between 
speech and a governmental or private “speaker” is not always a straightfor-
ward one, determined with simple reference to ownership of the locus or 
apparatus of speech.214 To borrow from the terminology of philosophy of 
language, endorsement is but one of many “speech acts” that a speaker may 
perform.215 It is one of many possible relationships between the speaker and 
the symbolic object. Depending on the context, the speech act may, instead, 
be one of referring to or commemorating a historical event;216 of acknowl-
edging or giving thanks for a contribution;217 or even of “quoting” a private 
speaker’s speech by bracketing or distancing the message itself in favor of 
inclusion based on some other principle—such as when a government entity 
opens a library, operates a public forum for free speech, or selects works of 
art for a publicly owned museum.218 The nature of the speech act depends 
on the context of the speech, which may consist of a large—even limit-
less—number of factors.219 For this reason, though property ownership is 
inextricably interwoven with the problem of attribution and of the social 
meaning of a display, it is not always identical to, nor coextensive with, 
either meaning or attribution.  
In Summum, Justice Alito exploited this distinction, discussing the re-
lationship between attribution and ownership at some length.220 He began 
by noting that the government’s ownership of the park and acceptance of 
the privately donated monuments therein tended to indicate that the monu-
ments were the government’s own speech: “It certainly is not common for 
property owners to open up their property for the installation of permanent 
monuments that convey a message with which they do not wish to be asso-
ciated.”221 As such, in general, monuments, whether commissioned by the 
  
 214 Greene, supra note 204, at 850. 
 215 In other work, the author has used philosophy of language to illuminate problems associated 
with religious speech and the endorsement test. Hill, supra note 49, at 511-12; Hill, supra note 179, at 
731-32. 
 216 An example might be a monument that recognizes the role of a particular religious or mission-
ary group in a city’s founding. 
 217 Cf. Norton, supra note 205, at 622 (discussing acknowledgement of a private entity’s contribu-
tion as expressive behavior). 
 218 Cf. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476 n.5 (“Museums display works of art 
that express many different sentiments, and the significance of a donated work of art to its creator or 
donor may differ markedly from a museum’s reasons for accepting and displaying the work. For exam-
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or is perceived as conveying the same ‘message.’”). 
 219 Hill, supra note 49, at 512-13. Professor Abner Greene also refers to “local” or “background” 
understandings. Greene, supra note 210, at 1255-56 (“local understandings”); Greene, supra note 204, at 
851 (“background understandings”). 
 220 Summum, 555 U.S. at 471-77. 
 221 Id. at 471. 
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government or simply accepted by it when offered, “have the effect of con-
veying a government message, and they thus constitute government 
speech.”222  
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Alito was undoubtedly aware of 
the path he had to negotiate between the Scylla of Summum’s free speech 
claim and the Charybdis of a potential, future Establishment Clause claim. 
If the Ten Commandments and other monuments in the public park were 
not government speech, then the park was a public forum for private 
speech, and the city had discriminated against Summum by rejecting its 
contribution. But if the Ten Commandments were government speech, then 
the city was vulnerable to an Establishment Clause claim that it had openly 
endorsed the religious speech contained therein.223 Thus, Justice Alito care-
fully explained how government speech that is facially religious could 
nonetheless fail to be religious speech that is endorsed by the govern-
ment.224  
First, he pointed out that monuments can convey more than one mes-
sage, and that the meaning of a monument can change over time.225 Addi-
tionally, and crucially, he described the act of possessing and placing the 
monument on city property as, itself, an expressive act—one that, presuma-
bly, expresses a relationship between the government speaker and the 
speech.226 He thus recognized that, while the Ten Commandments monu-
ment contains facially religious language, the speech act that results from 
the particular situation is not necessarily one of endorsement of the monu-
ment’s religious message. Indeed, for this reason he also rejected Sum-
mum’s argument that, if the City wanted to claim the speech in Pioneer 
Park as government speech, it should be required formally to endorse the 
speech.227 Instead, his opinion intimated, the actual message or effect is 
  
 222 Id. at 472. 
 223 Cf. Roy, supra note 175, at 280 (“If Pleasant Grove argued too vigorously the theory that the 
existing Ten Commandments monument constitutes the city’s own message, then it risked violating the 
Establishment Clause in a follow-up lawsuit based on the same facts. If, on the other hand, Pleasant 
Grove attributed the monument’s message to its 1971 donor, then the city would be hard-pressed to 
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 224 Summum, 555 U.S. at 474. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. at 476 (“By accepting a privately donated monument and placing it on city property, a city 
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dependent on various features of the physical, temporal, and social con-
text—including the nature of the space in which the monument is placed 
and the other items surrounding it.228 Justice Alito seemed to suggest that 
while the message on the Ten Commandments monument itself was explic-
itly religious (exhorting the reader to, for example, keep holy the Sabbath), 
the message conveyed by the city’s placement of the Ten Commandments 
in Pioneer Park, along with “a historic granary, a wishing well, the City’s 
first fire station, [and] a September 11 monument”229 was more incoher-
ent—perhaps something like, “These are things that are important to the 
citizens of Pleasant Grove.”230 Justice Alito therefore seemed to insist that 
the city has not automatically endorsed the content of the Ten Command-
ments monument by accepting ownership of it.  
Nonetheless, the Court’s opinion at times suggests that not just the en-
tire Pioneer Park display, but in fact each monument in it, is government 
speech. It asserts, for example, that “the City’s intends the monument to 
speak on its behalf,” and that “[t]he monuments that are accepted . . . consti-
tute government speech.”231 The Court equivocates somewhat on this point, 
however, later asserting that “the City’s decision to accept certain privately 
donated monuments while rejecting respondent’s is best viewed as a form 
of government speech.”232 The opinion is decidedly indecisive as to what, 
exactly, constitutes the speech.233 Still, the overwhelmingly clear message is 
this: ownership of speech is distinct from endorsement of a specific mes-
sage.  
The distinction between ownership and attribution that Justice Alito 
exploited, however accurate as an abstract matter, is deeply troubling when 
placed in the context of government speech doctrine. Government speech, 
in Summum, is not so much speech attributable to or endorsed by the gov-
ernment, but rather speech that is, in an almost literal sense, owned by the 
government. But it is hard to see the justification for applying the govern-
  
government has not engaged in expressive conduct. This argument fundamentally misunderstands the 
way monuments convey meaning.”). 
 228 Id. at 476-77. Justice Alito’s view is clearly influenced by the mode of analysis the Court em-
ployed in other cases involving religious symbols, such as Lynch v. Donnelly. Elsewhere, the author has 
examined the idea of endorsement as a speech act and the importance of context in determining the 
message, or effect, of religious displays. See Hill, supra note 49, at 511-17. 
 229 Summum, 555 U.S. at 464-65. 
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to the City as creating a platform for private speech. Greene, supra note 210, at 1257. Professor Dolan 
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 231 Summum, 555 U.S. at 472-73 (emphasis added). 
 232 Id. at 481 (emphasis added). 
 233 Id. at 472-81. 
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ment speech doctrine in such a case—that is, to messages that the govern-
ment refuses to claim as its own.  
Government speech doctrine is generally justified on two instrumental 
grounds: first, as a valuable way of providing accurate information to the 
public, and second, as a means of informing the public of its governing 
body’s viewpoint on certain issues, thus promoting political accountabil-
ity.234 In the case of the Pioneer Park display (as opposed to public health-
related communications, for example) the first justification seems irrele-
vant. The second justification appears more relevant to Summum—the pub-
lic can vote its representatives out of office if it disagrees with the message 
of the monuments in the park—but is severely undermined by Justice 
Alito’s approach. First, it is not clear how the goals of government speech 
doctrine are supported by qualifying government speech as speech owned 
by the government but not always directly attributable to the government. 
For political accountability to function, the speech must be attributable to 
the government. In addition, Justice Alito’s refusal to specify a specific 
message expressed by the government speech—either from the individual 
Ten Commandments monument, or from the collection of monuments, or 
from the act of selecting particular monuments—similarly undermines the 
goals of the government speech doctrine. Neither information sharing nor 
political accountability for messages can be achieved when the message 
conveyed is itself unclear. 
Nonetheless, according to Justice Alito’s view, Pleasant Grove City 
obtained the right to exclude other voices, without necessitating any judicial 
inquiry into whether the exclusion was impermissibly discriminatory, by 
taking ownership of the speech in Pioneer Park while distancing itself from 
the resulting message.235 Justice Alito’s particular take on government 
speech doctrine in the Summum case thus focuses on ownership rather than 
attribution, in direct contrast to the aims of the doctrine itself.236 
  
 234 See, e.g., Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 
983, 994 (2005); Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech, supra note 168, at 20-23. Regarding 
the first justification, Professor Michael Dorf adds the perspective that:  
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ble behavior—such as recycling—through campaigns of public education; and government 
builds community by such measures as erecting monuments and curating museums. 
 
Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings, 97 VA. L. 
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 235 Summum, 555 U.S. at 473-74. 
 236 See id. 
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B. A Critique of the Property Framework 
So far, this Article has illustrated the way in which the Court has 
turned to property concepts in dealing with the thorny First Amendment 
questions raised by public displays of religious symbolism. As illustrated 
above, there was nothing inevitable about the Court’s choice of frame-
work—the Court could have considered Summum within a viewpoint dis-
crimination paradigm, or it could have adopted a government speech ra-
tionale that rendered the inclusion of the Ten Commandments constitution-
ally problematic. And it could have treated Buono under the endorsement 
test, by asking whether the social meaning of the Government’s actions, 
including the land transfer, constituted an endorsement of Christianity and a 
message of exclusion to nonadherents. Instead, the Court turned to proper-
ty, both as a legal solution and as a rhetorical framework.237 The Court 
treated the literal ownership of the land and symbols as a dispositive factor, 
whether the ownership was governmental or private.238 In addition, the lan-
guage of private property permeates both opinions.239  
This Section argues that property—or at least the Court’s particular 
property-as-exclusion manifestation of property law and rhetoric240—is a 
poor fit with the Supreme Court’s existing Establishment Clause and free 
speech doctrines and the ideals of equality, inclusion, and nondiscrimina-
tion that they embody.241 Indeed, by shifting the focus in its religious sym-
bolism cases from social meaning and viewpoint discrimination to owner-
ship of speech, the Court not only minimizes the importance of those con-
cepts but also introduces into the case law a perspective that is diametrically 
opposed to them. 
The private property framework, as it is mobilized by the Court, is 
troubling in numerous respects. First, although property law appears to pro-
  
 237 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1815-20 (2010) (plurality opinion); Summum, 555 U.S. at 
467-81. 
 238 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1815-20 (plurality opinion); see also Summum, 555 U.S. at 467-81. 
 239 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1811-1821 (plurality opinion); Summum, 555 U.S. at 464-81. 
 240 As noted above, property is not unavoidably associated primarily with exclusion, but property-
as-exclusion is one dominant mode of understanding private property. See supra notes 23-26 and ac-
companying text. 
 241 The Court can be considered to have engaged in a form of “constitutional borrowing,” as de-
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Establishment Clause domains. 
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vide a convenient and noncontroversial set of neutral principles for deciding 
difficult controversial cases, that neutrality is largely illusory. The Court’s 
use of property law and property-based reasoning, while formalistic and 
arguably even simplistic, merely masks enormous complexity rather than 
resolving it. In addition, the Court’s use of the law and language of property 
is animated by concepts such as exclusion, absolutism, inequality, and hier-
archy. Rather than enforcing true neutrality, the property paradigm helps to 
reinforce a particular political identity that excludes religious outsiders by 
both centralizing and naturalizing the exclusion that lies at the heart of the 
concept of property. Consequently, this Article argues that the Court 
should, in the future, dispense with the easy device of property law and 
rhetoric and instead confront the substantive First Amendment issues raised 
by the presence of religious displays in public places. This does not mean 
that property must be abandoned or ignored altogether, of course—but 
simply that it must be put in its place. 
1. Property and Neutral Principles 
Property law must have seemed to the Justices like a desirable way to 
resolve the complex issues in Summum and Buono. Rather than requiring 
messy inquiry into the heavily context-dependent concept of social mean-
ing242 or the unruly analysis of whether viewpoint discrimination has oc-
curred in a government-sponsored forum, ownership and property appeared 
to be neat, formalistic categories.243 If the speech is government speech, 
then, according to the understanding of private-property-as-exclusion, the 
government has the right to exclude any other speakers, for any reason 
whatsoever. If the land on which the cross monument stands is owned by a 
private party, not the Government, it raises no Establishment Clause con-
cerns. End of story.244  
Summum and Buono are not the only cases in which the Court sought 
refuge in property law’s neutral and categorical quality, but with limited 
  
 242 See generally Hill, supra note 49 (discussing the difficulties that inhere in any analysis of social 
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area in modern constitutional law, but it comes close.”); Note, Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 2140, 2141 (2009) (“[I]n recent years, forum analysis has become a muddled area of 
First Amendment jurisprudence.”). 
 244 It is not difficult, moreover, to see the attraction of the “private law model” for a Court such as 
the Roberts Court, which seems to sympathize greatly with the traditional model of adjudication and 
valorization of the private law world. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1288 (1976) (describing the affiliation between the private law 
model of litigation and traditionally conservative political attitudes). 
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success. In the 1979 case of Jones v. Wolf,245 the Supreme Court embraced 
the concept of “neutral principles” in the context of a church property dis-
pute.246 In that case, the Court faced difficult Establishment Clause and free 
exercise issues raised by a dispute over who owned church property after a 
schism in a local church.247 The Court purported to avoid all of those issues, 
however, by allowing the state courts to apply “neutral principles of law,” 
apparently defined as “objective, well-established concepts of trust and 
property law familiar to lawyers and judges.”248 Applying those neutral 
principles, the Court held, “promise[d] to free civil courts completely from 
entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.”249 
Similarly, in Adderley v. Florida,250 the Court purported to apply straight-
forward trespass principles to hold that the First Amendment did not grant a 
right to engage in a civil rights protest on the grounds of a municipal jail: 
“Nothing in the Constitution of the United States prevents Florida from 
even-handed enforcement of its general trespass statute,” the Court ex-
plained.251 “The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power 
to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully 
dedicated.”252 
The dissent in Jones argued, however, that the turn to purportedly neu-
tral property principles often suppresses or assumes away the underlying 
constitutional questions.253 Similarly, the dissent in Adderley complained of 
the “violence” done to free speech principles when a case about the right to 
protest was “turned into a trespass action.”254 The formalistic language of 
the Court’s property analysis conceals difficult balancing questions that do 
not lend themselves to straightforward, formalistic analysis. Property rights 
simply are not as categorical as they appear, especially when public proper-
ty is involved. Moreover, as discussed below,255 property law and property 
rhetoric is often charged with connotations of exclusion, inequality, and 
hierarchy.256  
  
 245 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
 246 Id. at 597. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. at 602-03. 
 249 Id. at 603. 
 250 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
 251 Id. at 47. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Jones, 443 U.S. at 614-16 (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for leaving unre-
solved the “basic question” of “which faction should have control of the local church” and “afford[ing] 
no guidance as to the constitutional limitations” on the use of neutral principles such as restrictive evi-
dentiary rules). 
 254 Adderley, 385 U.S. at 52 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 255 See infra Part III.B.2-3. 
 256 The author has made some of these arguments, in much briefer form, with respect to the use of 
forum doctrine in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. Hill, supra note 157, at 53-56. 
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Relatedly, the rhetoric of property-as-exclusion tends toward a certain 
absolute quality. Although property rights, like every other right, may at 
some point be limited or even sacrificed when necessary for the public 
good, the language of property-as-exclusion ignores those limits. The most 
famous example of this absolutism is Blackstone’s widely cited (if inaccu-
rate) description of property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one 
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total ex-
clusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”257 Blackstonian 
ownership, moreover, is almost always configured not just as dominion and 
control but as complete dominion and control.258 Consider, for example, the 
following language from Chabad of Southern Ohio & Congregation Lubav-
itch v. City of Cincinnati,259 in which the City of Cincinnati justified its ex-
clusion of a privately owned menorah from a holiday display on the city’s 
central public square by claiming that the speech taking place in the square 
during the holiday season was government speech.260 The City passed an 
ordinance declaring: 
The City has an inherent right to control its property, which includes a right to close a previ-
ously open forum. During times of exclusive use by the City of Cincinnati, the City will bear 
the ultimate responsibility for the content of the display or event. No other party, other than 
the City of Cincinnati, may make decisions with regard to any aspect of the event and/or dis-
play. No private participation with regard to any aspect of the event and/or display will be 
permitted at this time. However, the City may accept donations or funds from other entities 
for the event and/or display which is the subject of exclusive use. As a result of its sole re-
sponsibility, ownership, management and control by the City of Cincinnati during times of 
exclusive use, it is recognized the City is engaging in government speech.261 
The City’s repeated use of terms such as “exclusive,” “sole,” and “ulti-
mate,” as well as the unyielding overall tone of its statement, suggest that it 
has embraced the view of property rights as absolute dominion.262 The invo-
cation of government speech, which implies the government’s private own-
ership of speech, produces a sort of totalizing language.263 
However, this categorical view of property rights, which makes cases 
like Summum and Buono suddenly appear to be clear and easy, turning on 
questions of ownership and nothing else, is thoroughly inaccurate. When 
public property is involved, at least, the case is considerably more compli-
  
 257 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2; see also FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS 
ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 11 (1985); Joan Williams, The 
Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 281 (1998). 
 258 See, e.g., Chabad of S. Ohio & Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati, 363 F.3d 427 (6th 
Cir. 2004). 
 259 363 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 260 Id. at 433-34. 
 261 Id. at 431 (quoting CINCINNATI MUN. CODE § 713-1). 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id. 
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cated. There is a long tradition of case law holding that the government 
does not possess an absolute right to exclude speakers from its property, 
merely by virtue of its ownership of that property.264 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court famously stated in Hague v. CIO:265  
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust 
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the 
streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, 
rights, and liberties of citizens.266  
In so holding, the Court rejected the government’s position, drawn from the 
older First Amendment case Davis v. Massachusetts,267 which opined, in-
stead, that public property “was absolutely under the control of the legisla-
ture,” and therefore that individuals had no right to use it “except in such 
mode and subject to such regulations as the legislature, in its wisdom, may 
have deemed proper to prescribe.”268  
Of course, there are other ways in which the law limits the govern-
ment’s power to exclude even in its role as property owner: nonpublic fora, 
for example, are subject to rules against viewpoint discrimination.269 The 
desegregation of public places limited the rights of governmental property 
owners in the interest of equality.270 For this reason, Professor Timothy Zick 
has argued, drawing on the language of Hague, that government property 
must be held in a sort of metaphorical public trust, “for the benefit of the 
public,” such that “public officials owe fiduciary duties of fair dealing, 
preservation, and compliance with constitutional covenants.”271 Likewise, 
Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., has spoken of a “First Amendment easement” 
to use the public streets for expressive purposes.272 
And indeed, even private property rights may be limited in the interest 
of constitutional values. Civil rights laws requiring equal access to privately 
owned accommodations limit private property rights in the interest of 
  
 264 See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
 265 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
 266 Id. at 515. 
 267 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
 268 Id. at 46-47 (quoted in Hague, 307 U.S. at 515). 
 269 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (noting that a 
governmental entity, “‘like the private owner of property, may legally preserve the property under its 
control for the use to which it is dedicated’” (quoting Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 (1993)), but it may not “exercise viewpoint discrimination, even when the 
limited public forum is one of its own creation”). 
 270 See, e.g., Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (2006). 
 271 Zick, supra note 27, at 1368, 1414. 
 272 Kalven, supra note 28, at 13. 
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equality.273 Moreover, although the First Amendment does not generally 
require private property owners to permit private speech on their land, the 
Supreme Court has upheld the power of a state supreme court to do just 
that.274 In his concurrence in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,275 Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall rejected an “overly formalistic view of the relation-
ship between the institution of private ownership of property and the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech,” pointing out that common-
law rights (unlike constitutional rights) are of course subject to legislative 
revision.276  
Similarly, in Marsh v. Alabama,277 the Court refused to find that a cor-
poration’s ownership of a “company town” meant that Jehovah’s Witnesses 
had no First Amendment right to solicit there, stating, “We do not agree 
that the corporation’s property interests settle the question.”278 Thus, the 
crux of the issue is, and has always been, not whether property law governs, 
but rather what substantive principles govern the limitations on the property 
owner’s rights. Blackstone notwithstanding, the Court in Marsh went so far 
as to affirm that “[o]wnership does not always mean absolute dominion.”279  
Nonetheless, in Summum and Buono the Court held that ownership 
was essentially dispositive. This formalistic property-based approach was 
apparent both in Buono’s view that transfer of title to a private party in-
stantly rendered the Establishment Clause question irrelevant280 and in the 
Summum Court’s formalistic and ownership-focused understanding of gov-
ernment speech as speech that is simply owned by the government, regard-
less of its actual attribution.281 Far from resolving everything, in other 
words, the purportedly neutral principles of property law in fact resolve 
  
 273 See, e.g., Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6. Of course, the 
Civil Rights Act is a statutory enactment, passed pursuant to Congress’s commerce power, not a consti-
tutional rule or an enactment pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. It therefore does not illustrate 
directly the use of constitutional laws to limit property rights, but it does illustrate the non-absolute 
quality of property rights. 
 274 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980). 
 275 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
 276 Id. at 91-93 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 542 (1976) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting)). Indeed, as Professor Zick has demonstrated, the Court has often shown a 
willingness to look beyond formal indicia of ownership when considering the impact of property dispo-
sitions on constitutional rights claims. He surveys a series of cases, involving equal protection, free 
speech, and the Establishment Clause, in which the Court has looked behind a property transfer to 
consider its effects on constitutional liberties. Zick, supra note 27, at 1368-1412. 
 277 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 278 Id. at 505; see also id. at 504-05 (“[A]n ordinance completely prohibiting the dissemination of 
ideas on the city streets can not [sic] be justified on the ground that the municipality holds legal title to 
them.”). 
 279 Id. at 506. 
 280 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819 (2010) (plurality opinion); cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 
403 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1971); supra note 148 (discussing Palmer). 
 281 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009). 
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very little. Moreover, the inaccurate and totalizing view of property in those 
cases inevitably minimizes the constitutional values at stake. In treating the 
government as a private property owner, the Court completely ignores the 
public’s expressive rights and stakes in what is, after all, public property.282 
2. Property, Exclusion, and Inequality 
The Supreme Court’s property rhetoric thus draws upon and reinforces 
the traditional view that exclusion is at the heart of property. Indeed, as the 
preceding discussion has demonstrated, the exercise of property rights in 
both cases—taking metaphorical ownership of the monuments’ speech in 
Summum and transferring literal ownership of the cross to a private party in 
Buono—resulted in the exclusion of particular undesired speakers or all 
other potential undesired speakers.283 The litigation, in both cases, was born 
of an act of governmental exclusion of a religious minority speaker, and 
that exclusion was upheld as valid in each case.284 An exclusion-based un-
derstanding of property is not the only possible one, of course; as explained 
above, many commentators, along with much Supreme Court precedent, 
recognize that property must be understood as fundamentally inclusive, and 
as serving other, more public values.285 The exclusion-based understanding 
of property is the one that drives the Court’s language and rhetoric in Sum-
mum and Buono, however.  
This particular concept of property is intimately associated with hier-
archy and inequality. Consider, for example, the feudal origins of the mod-
ern private property regime. In feudal times, the sovereign owned all prop-
erty, and thus all interests in property derived from the sovereign.286 One’s 
ownership of an interest in property therefore signified one’s relationship to 
the sovereign—in short, one’s social and political status.287 This association 
between property and status was magnified, moreover, by the fact that an 
ownership interest in property generally meant a right to the income derived 
from the labor of others who, by their lesser wealth and lower social status, 
were required to work on the land.288 Even today, one might argue, as did 
Professor Morris Cohen, that dominion over things (in the form of property) 
also entails power over other human beings, because property law allows us 
to exclude others from the things that they need, compelling them to pro-
  
 282 Cf. Zick, supra note 27, at 1414. 
 283 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819 (plurality opinion); Summum, 555 U.S. at 473. 
 284 See supra text accompanying notes 96-143. 
 285 See supra note 23. 
 286 See PENNER, supra note 23, at 212. Forrest McDonald contends that this view still persisted in 
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tion of property. MCDONALD, supra note 257, at 11-12. 
 287 See PENNER, supra note 23, at 212-15. 
 288 See id. at 212-13. 
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vide their labor in order to obtain those necessities.289 Thus, private proper-
ty’s origin is, in part, a signifier of hierarchy and one’s place within it.  
Of course, in some ways, in America, property came to represent just 
the opposite of what it represented in the feudal system. Professor Joseph 
Singer has argued, for example, that property law is the “infrastructure of 
democracy”;290 that property, regulation, and equal opportunity are of one 
piece.291 Others have pointed to the fact that property rights and civil liber-
ties, rather than existing in irresolvable tension, were understood by the 
Founders as inextricably intertwined.292 At the same time that the Founders 
appreciated the relationship between property and liberty, however, they 
worried that too much equality—too much democratic rule—would under-
mine property rights.293 According to Professor Jennifer Nedelsky, for ex-
ample, the Founders themselves saw property both as central to their con-
ception of democracy and as a reflection of natural inequalities.294 Since “an 
unequal distribution of property was the inevitable result of men’s freedom 
to use their ‘different and unequal faculties of acquiring property,’” the 
property of the minority would always need to be protected from the major-
ity that lacked it; individual property rights therefore had to be balanced 
with democratic rule in the form of a constitutional democracy.295 Property 
was understood as embodying a natural and inevitable hierarchy, and it is 
this version of property that seems to motivate the Court’s decisions in 
Summum and Buono.296  
  
 289 Cohen, supra note 23, at 12. Yet, Professor Cohen continues, “[t]he character of property as 
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Indeed, Professor Joan Williams has documented the continuing influ-
ence, exerted in part through the canonical cases of property law, of the 
view that property derives from individuals’ own hard work and merit; as 
such it “sets . . . off limits” any question about the unequal distribution of 
property rights today, suggesting that such inequality is a natural effect of 
property’s origins in “human hunger and human sweat.”297 Relatedly, Pro-
fessor Cheryl Harris has elucidated, powerfully and at length, the relation-
ship between property and racial inequality.298 For example, she describes 
how the “racial and cultural otherness” of the Native Americans came to be 
“reinterpreted and ultimately erased as a basis for asserting rights in land”; 
today, when race-conscious remedies are proposed to make up for past ine-
qualities, property rights are again asserted as a neutral reason for refusing 
to upset existing entitlements.299  
This naturalization of inequality risks reinforcing existing inequalities 
by making them invisible. And by presenting apparently neutral principles 
for judicial decision making, in the form of protecting preexisting owner-
ship rights according to well-established legal regimes, property law argua-
bly both reinforces the underlying economic inequalities and makes those 
inequalities seem like a mere preexisting fact, a natural state of affairs in 
which the law has played no role.300 Though it is not the only possible con-
ception of property, the Supreme Court’s particular deployment of property 
in Summum and Buono—as a means of eliminating rather than embracing 
claims for inclusion and masking rather than leveling inequality—
highlights the association between property and inequality. Moreover, by 
appearing to appeal to neutral principles of property law, the Court’s deci-
sions in both Summum and Buono resulted in governmental acts of exclu-
sion. In Summum, the exclusion of Summum’s message was literal. Once 
the speech in Pioneer Park was characterized as belonging to the City, the 
reasons for Summum’s exclusion seemed irrelevant; the City could obvi-
ously construct its message—that is, use its property—however it wished. 
The inclusion of the Ten Commandments in that identity message, moreo-
ver, did not appear to strike the majority as problematic.  
  
persons must have more property than others, it is from the nature of things impossible to 
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In Buono, both the literal exclusion of all other speakers—including 
the Buddhists who wished to erect a shrine at the site of the cross—and the 
symbolic exclusion of nonadherents in the form of the cross’s message 
were reinforced by the use of the property framework.301 Of course, a pri-
vate party could not be forced to allow a Buddhist shrine on its land, prop-
erty law tells us. The literal exclusion thus seems a matter of common 
sense. The symbolic exclusion of non-Christians from the war memorial—
and its invisibility—is perhaps best exemplified by Justice Scalia’s ex-
change with plaintiff’s counsel over the sectarian nature of the Mojave De-
sert cross to this dynamic of naturalized inequality or hierarchy.302 The ex-
change proceeded as follows: 
JUSTICE SCALIA: [The cross is] erected as a war memorial. I assume it is erected in honor 
of all of the war dead. It’s the -- the cross is the -- is the most common symbol of -- of -- of 
the resting place of the dead, and it doesn’t seem to me -- what would you have them erect? 
A cross -- some conglomerate of a cross, a Star of David, and you know, a Moslem half 
moon and star? 
MR. ELIASBERG: . . . . The cross is the most common symbol of the resting place of Chris-
tians. I have been in Jewish cemeteries. There is never a cross on a tombstone of a Jew.303 
Justice Scalia then characterized as “outrageous” the notion that “the 
only war dead that that cross honors are the Christian war dead.”304 Justice 
Scalia’s inability to see the sectarian nature of the cross as a symbol of the 
dead may well be due to personal experience, upbringing, or biases. But it 
also seems to reflect a viewpoint that resounds deeply with the rhetoric of 
property-as-exclusion and its tendency to treat social structures as inevita-
ble and hierarchies as natural. Justice Scalia’s remark suggests that the 
cross’s meaning as a war memorial is owned by the majority and thus dic-
tated by the majority viewpoint.305 Moreover, any claim for inclusion or 
equal regard is almost illegible in this context, in which the cross is private 
property, to be exchanged at will, rather than a symbol the meaning of 
which must be evaluated according to First Amendment constraints.  
This propertization of the memorial and its message casts nonadher-
ents to Christianity, if not as unwelcome intruders, then as “guests” in an-
other’s home or ceremony, to adopt Professor Alan Brownstein’s elegant 
  
 301 Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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metaphor.306 To place non-Christian veterans and visitors to the national 
memorial in that role, whether because of the Government’s ownership of 
the symbol or a private party’s ownership, is to grant them the social status 
of an outsider, or at least a non-insider. But as Professor Martha Nussbaum 
argues, American democracy and respect for human dignity, expressed in 
part through the Establishment Clause, “may not make citizenship hierar-
chical. . . . [A]ll citizens must be able to enter the public square on equal 
conditions.”307 Indeed, evoking feudal imagery, Professor Nussbaum asserts 
that “a failure of respect in the symbolic domain is like an insult, a slap in 
the face, and, moreover, it is the sort of slap in the face that a noble gives to 
a vassal, one that both expresses and constitutes a hierarchy of ranks.”308 
The Court’s ultimate disposition of Buono—its privatizing of the cross 
and concomitant assumption that the property transaction would answer the 
Establishment Clause question—allowed the Court to decline to grapple 
with the very real challenge presented to Justice Scalia’s viewpoint by 
plaintiff’s counsel’s response.309 But perhaps more importantly, it erased the 
very question that the Court was supposed to answer—whether the cross 
impermissibly cast non-Christians as outsiders—by treating that outsider 
status as a natural and inevitable function of the preexisting property enti-
tlements, both legal and metaphorical.310 
The formalizing and naturalizing rhetoric of private property encour-
ages the reader to focus not on the underlying constitutional values but ra-
ther on legal entitlements to land and objects. This function of the Court’s 
rhetoric is particularly troublesome in the context of First Amendment doc-
trine, however. The property framework embraced in Summum and Buono, 
and the absolute control and right to exclude that it implies, conflict pro-
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foundly with the core ideals of equality and inclusion that animate the en-
dorsement test.  
As Professors Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager have pointed 
out, the endorsement test is concerned primarily with equality, with “equal 
liberty” of conscience, and with avoiding the disparagement of religious 
outsiders in society.311 The concept of equality is closely tied to the concept 
of inclusiveness, particularly with respect to religious outsiders. Thus, other 
First Amendment scholars have also highlighted the connection among the 
endorsement test, inclusion, and equality. In an early meditation on the en-
dorsement test, Professor Neal Feigenson argued that the test “prohibits 
government from using religion to affect its citizens’ participation in the 
political community” with the goal of ensuring equality.312  
After all, the purpose served by ensuring such specific civil rights as the right to vote, speak 
freely, hold office, or serve on juries is to guarantee to each citizen an equal opportunity to 
wield lawfully the power of persuasion and thus to help shape political decisions. Equal par-
ticipation is the ultimate value.313  
Similarly, Professor Lisa Shaw Roy has noted that the Court’s Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence pertaining to religious displays “is largely about 
protecting the feelings of the nonadherent from a public manifestation that 
may confer outsider status.”314 
Professor Nussbaum has also, recently and influentially, articulated a 
theory of religious freedom and nonestablishment grounded in equality and 
equal respect.315 In regard to public displays of religious symbolism, in par-
ticular, Professor Nussbaum contends that a decisional framework focused 
on supporting equality and avoiding the stigmatization of minority religions 
and nonreligious individuals is the best one.316 Indeed, she argues that the 
equality-based understanding of the Establishment Clause fits best with the 
original, historical understanding of the First Amendment and its underly-
ing principles.317 
For this reason, too, the defense of the Court’s recent religious sym-
bolism jurisprudence on the ground that it is intended simply to defuse cul-
tural tensions must be rejected.318 The Court’s approach, though perhaps 
aimed at avoiding divisiveness, poses a significant risk of rendering invisi-
  
 311 EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 22, at 122-27. 
 312 Neal R. Feigenson, Political Standing and Governmental Endorsement of Religion: An Alterna-
tive to Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 53, 66-67 (1990). 
 313 Id. at 67 (footnote omitted). 
 314 Lisa Shaw Roy, The Establishment Clause and the Concept of Inclusion, 83 OR. L. REV. 1, 20 
(2004). 
 315 NUSSBAUM, supra note 34, at 34-71. 
 316 See id. at 260-65. 
 317 See id. at 34-114. 
 318 See supra text accompanying note 193. 
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ble the harm of exclusion—harm that will not be less real simply because it 
goes unacknowledged. The precise tendency of property language is to ren-
der natural and invisible the act of exclusion; it is thus no answer to those 
who claim to have received a symbolic message of exclusion to say that the 
Court will resolve religious disputes on property grounds in order to sub-
merge disagreement over the exclusionary nature of the display’s message 
and whether it is constitutionally permissible. What appears to be consensus 
may be more accurately characterized as a suppression of debate in favor of 
the status quo. 
3. Property, Identity, and Expression 
Scholars have noted the expressive nature of property.319 Justice Alito, 
too, highlighted the ability of monuments to “speak for” a city.320 In addi-
tion, monuments not only speak for the government—they purport to repre-
sent something about the government’s identity. In this way, the concepts 
of property, attribution, and identity are intimately related in the expressive 
function of both the symbol itself and the government’s ownership and 
placement of it. Indeed, the very term “property” derives from the Latin 
word that also refers to that which is individual and specific to oneself; we 
speak of persons and things as having certain “properties,” in the sense of 
identity traits.321  
Professor Carol Rose, in examining the concept of possession in rela-
tion to property, has written of possession as a form of communication. 
Using the example of adverse possession, Professor Rose notes that it is not 
so much actual control but a “declaration of one’s intent to appropriate” that 
is key to indicating possession for the purposes of triggering that doctrine.322 
“Possession as the basis of property ownership, then, seems to amount to 
something like yelling loudly enough to all who may be interested,” she 
concludes.323 “The first to say, ‘This is mine,’ in a way that the public un-
derstands, gets the prize, and the law will help him keep it against someone 
else who says, ‘No, it is mine.’”324  
  
 319 E.g., Blocher, supra note 28; Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra note 114. 
 320 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009). 
 321 See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1405 (4th ed. 
2006) (giving one definition of property as “[a] characteristic trait or peculiarity, especially one serving 
to define or describe its possessor,” and noting the word’s derivation from the Latin word proprius); 
C.T. LEWIS, ELEMENTARY LATIN DICTIONARY 664 (1963) (defining proprius as “not common with 
others, own, special, several, individual . . . each man’s own, . . . [p]ersonal”). 
 322 Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 77 (1985) (citing 2 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 257, at *9, *258). 
 323 Id. at 81. 
 324 Id. 
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Similarly, the government’s possession of a religious symbol, and its 
treatment of that symbol as its property, seems to say that the symbol “be-
longs to” our polity and is intimately connected with it. It is an act of defin-
ing a political community through its possession of the symbol.325 One 
might think of the original act that gave rise to the Buono litigation as such 
an act.326 Whether so intended or not, the private citizens’ act of installing a 
sectarian war memorial on government-owned property appears as a form 
of claim staking, forcefully and forcibly identifying the nation, and the na-
tional experience of loss in World War I, with the Christian symbol, and 
vice versa.327 In the words of Professor Nussbaum, “[s]tates really do want 
to announce that theirs is a Christian, or perhaps a Judeo-Christian, state,” 
and they do so in part by erecting sectarian symbols in public spaces.328 
The government’s ownership and control of the symbol as property is 
itself a speech act that both describes and constructs a particular reality—a 
reality in which the community at issue is designated a Christian communi-
ty.329 This effect, moreover, is magnified by the ultimately circular and self-
defining nature of this exercise in possession. The more the government 
announces its exclusion of those who do not “belong,” the more it is enti-
tled to do so—that is, the less likely it is that the forum at issue will be 
found to be a public forum subject to constraints on viewpoint discrimina-
tion.  
The longer and the more notorious the exclusion, too, the more likely 
that religious symbols challenged under the Establishment Clause will be 
found to have acquired a sort of immunity by “adverse possession.”330 An 
example of this kind of adverse possession arises in the case of the Ten 
Commandments monument in Van Orden v. Perry, which, Justice Breyer 
noted, had gone unchallenged for forty years and was therefore unlikely to 
be divisive:  
  
 325 Relatedly, Professor Zick has expressed concern about the way in which Summum, and its use 
of private property analogies, undermines free speech and public forum concepts by treating a public 
park both as a locus for, and as a form of, expression of a government message, rather than as a space 
for expression of the public’s messages in the form of a diversity of private voices. Timothy Zick, 
Summum, the Vocality of Public Places, and the Public Forum, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2203. 
 326 Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 548-49 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 327 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811-12 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 328 NUSSBAUM, supra note 34, at 266. Along similar lines, Professor Adam Samaha has suggested 
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displays attempt to proselytize as that they perform a “sorting” function along religious lines—they 
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lines. Samaha, supra note 172, at 137-38. 
 329 In an earlier article, the author discussed at length the power of religious speech acts both to 
describe and to construct a particular reality. Hill, supra note 179, at 735, 756-58. 
 330 See JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
EXPERIMENT 235 (3d ed. 2011). 
2013] (DIS)OWNING RELIGIOUS SPEECH 411 
As far as I can tell, 40 years passed in which the presence of this monument, legally speak-
ing, went unchallenged . . . . Those 40 years suggest that the public visiting the capitol 
grounds has considered the religious aspect of the tablets’ message as part of what is a 
broader moral and historical message reflective of a cultural heritage.331 
Through a kind of adverse possession, this language implies, the Ten 
Commandments have become a part of our culture, losing their quality as a 
religious symbol affiliated only with certain religious belief systems. Like 
many instances of so-called “ceremonial deism,” including the words “un-
der God” in the Pledge of Allegiance and the words “In God We Trust” on 
our coins, Justice Breyer’s language and logic imply, such symbols are un-
challengeable because our culture has come to possess them and become 
identified with them in this manner.332 
Finally, and relatedly, the shift to a property paradigm for deciding re-
ligious symbolism cases also shifts control over the meaning of the gov-
ernment’s actions from the hypothetical “reasonable observer” back to the 
government. Although some have argued that the endorsement test’s “rea-
sonable observer” embodies the viewpoint of the “reasonable nonadher-
ent,”333 and others have criticized the test for failing to do so, the endorse-
ment test clearly does not allow the government to definitively establish the 
meaning of its own message.334 In disjunctively providing that a govern-
mental act is forbidden if it has the purpose or effect of sending an alienat-
ing message to religious outsiders, the endorsement test instead explicitly 
recognizes that the government may send a message that is other than what 
it intended, but that the unintended message may still cause constitutional 
injury.335 The property paradigm, by contrast, allows the government to 
short-circuit the endorsement inquiry, rendering the perspective of the 
viewer irrelevant. Although the endorsement test may have a tendency to-
  
 331 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 702-03 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). Indeed, it is unclear 
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ward indeterminacy or even a majoritarian bias, the property paradigm 
eliminates consideration of the religious outsider altogether.336 
IV. REFLECTIONS ON SUMMUM AND BUONO IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
CULTURE WARS 
This Part provides some brief reflections on how one might understand 
the shift to property law and rhetoric in the Supreme Court’s religious sym-
bolism jurisprudence, placed in the broader context of the culture wars. The 
property paradigm may be understood both as a way of harnessing the pow-
er of property in articulating the harm perceived by certain members of 
society when the public square is stripped of religious symbolism and as a 
way of re-inscribing a societal power structure that may have been threat-
ened, in one domain, by the rise of the endorsement test. 
First, the use of the private property framework may be understood as 
an attempt to find a powerful way of articulating the nature of the injury 
suffered by those who would keep their religious symbols in a privileged 
place. As Professors Eisgruber and Sager have eloquently explained, pas-
sions are intense both for and against the removal of religious symbolism in 
public places.337 Yet, it is difficult to explain precisely why individuals on 
both sides are so invested in the controversy—and, particularly, why the 
absence of religious symbolism is considered by some to be a form of dis-
paragement equivalent to that experienced by religious outsiders confronted 
with symbols of the majority religion.338 By placing an overlay of private 
property rhetoric on the religious speech at issue, those who would preserve 
the right of the government to place certain symbols of its choosing in the 
public square call forth all of the emotional power that the concept of prop-
erty—particularly in its traditional Blackstonian manifestation—evokes in 
the American imagination.  
Numerous commentators have noted the uniquely emotional attach-
ment that many Americans have to the concept of property. Indeed, the idea 
of property possesses a certain “mythic quality.”339 As Professor Nedelsky 
explains the appeal of property to the Founders, “[p]roperty was ‘some-
thing’ which was important, which required and was entitled to protection, 
which could be threatened and whose destruction or violation would cause 
far-reaching damage.”340 The mere invocation of property, especially when 
  
 336 Hill, supra note 49, at 493-95. 
 337 EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 22, at 128-30. 
 338 Id. 
 339 Nedelsky, supra note 294, at 244. 
 340 Id. at 252 n.19. Indeed, Professor Nedelsky adds, “It is as though property rights have remained 
infused with a natural-rights quality long after natural-rights theories were no longer accepted.” Id. 
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physical ownership of property is involved, is a “‘showstopper[] of persua-
sion.’”341  
In other words, casting religious symbolism in terms of property rheto-
ric gives concrete shape to the injury that some members of society feel 
when their religious symbols are removed. The loss of the symbols is a loss 
of status, of one’s standing within the social hierarchy—just as a loss of 
one’s property in feudal times would accompany a loss of social or political 
status and of one’s particular relationship to the sovereign. Viewed as such, 
removal of religious symbols from the public square is a kind of “taking” of 
the Christian majority’s heretofore privileged status. 
Indeed, Professor Gene Nichol has described in very similar terms his 
experience when, as President of the College of William and Mary, he 
made the decision to remove a historic crucifix from its place of promi-
nence in the college chapel. “What surprised me,” he writes,  
was how frequently and how powerfully so much of the discussion and correspondence I had 
with opponents of my decision also tracked the rhetoric of equality disputes—echoing not 
only the rejection of the different, of the stranger, but pressing claims of status, of entitle-
ment, of expectation, of privilege and ownership.342  
Tying his own experience to Professor Nussbaum’s theory that the value of 
equality must guide decision making on the permissibility of religious sym-
bolism, he argues that “efforts to insist on the governmental display of ma-
jority religious symbols” tend to “stake a visible claim of ownership, identi-
fying an institution, or a locale, or a government, as their own.”343 
Property rhetoric may be appealing for another reason, as well. In her 
recent history of the role of religious groups in shaping the constitutional 
law of religion, Professor Sarah Barringer Gordon notes that in both the 
1950s and the Cold War, perceived threats to the dominant Christianity 
from secularizing forces in American society were closely associated with 
communism in the minds and rhetoric of the Christian Right.344 “In their 
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view, secularism and communism traveled hand in glove, while religion 
and American democracy provided the only reliable safeguards against the 
Communist conspiracy.”345 In the later twentieth century, secularism also 
became associated with the struggle for equal rights for women and racial 
minorities.346 Today, these sentiments—anticommunism, antifeminism, and 
anti-civil rights—continue to hold some sway, in some contexts. Yet, they 
seem to lack the emotional power that they held fifty, or even twenty-five, 
years ago. Though culture war disputes continue to rage around women’s 
reproductive rights, the status of traditional marriage, and affirmative ac-
tion, a return to the language of property conjures an emotional response 
unlike most appeals to anticommunism and anti-equal-rights sentiments. It 
draws on a rhetoric that is both new and venerable, distinct from the earlier 
rhetoric of anticommunism and antifeminism, yet affiliated with them in its 
individualism and in its valorization of the hierarchical status quo.347 
The turn to property talk may also be a response to a perceived imbal-
ance of power in this particular legal domain that had taken hold during the 
time that Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test held sway. The tendency of 
property to present the preexisting social order as natural and foreordained 
must be appealing to those Justices who felt that the “outsider” perspective 
of the nonadherent had come to dominate Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence in this area.348 The language of private property is a response to the 
rise of the reasonable observer and a reassertion of the government’s power, 
on behalf of the majority, to control the meaning of its symbols. 
V. A RETURN TO FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES 
The Court should abandon its focus on property in religious display 
cases, at least insofar as it serves as a device for simplifying difficult First 
Amendment questions. Though the endorsement/equality approach is not 
without its flaws, a further elaboration of the constitutional values underly-
ing these disputes is preferable to avoidance.349 Moreover, to the extent that 
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the Court has adopted property as a means to defuse cultural tensions 
stemming from the Court’s articulation of the meaning and import of reli-
gious symbolism, a more refined approach to the endorsement/equality in-
quiry may be possible. 
Though there is reason to fear that the Court’s property paradigm 
might continue to exert influence in future cases, there is also reason to 
believe that this is not an inevitable outcome. Both Summum and Buono 
were characterized by certain idiosyncrasies that would allow the Court to 
avoid their full impact in the future.350 In Buono, the complex history of 
procedural maneuvering and congressionally authorized property transac-
tions make the case somewhat sui generis.351 In addition, the Court neither 
decided the Establishment Clause question nor officially abandoned the 
endorsement test; consequently, it may well be able to return to the en-
dorsement test in a future case raising the issue of a religious symbol on 
technically private, but ostensibly public, land.352  
Likewise, Summum was an odd sort of public forum challenge. It is 
hard to imagine the Court reaching a holding that a public park must be 
open to anyone who wants to place a permanent monument there.353 Given 
the oddity of the facts and the particular nature of the plaintiffs’ claims in 
Summum, then, the Court can limit its potential future damage by cabining 
its holding to its context of permanent, privately donated monuments in a 
public park, and resisting the temptation to allow the government speech 
doctrine to expand beyond its original borders.354 Finally, the Supreme 
Court in Summum decided no Establishment Clause issues, and it may well 
have occasion in the near future to decide a similar issue.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently considered a case involving the 
constitutionality of privately owned Latin crosses on public property serv-
ing as memorials to fallen highway patrolmen, which the Tenth Circuit held 
to be government speech and to violate the Establishment Clause.355 Alt-
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hough the Court ultimately denied certiorari, the existence of the case and 
the significant controversy it engendered—including two dissents from 
denial of rehearing en banc and one dissent from denial of certiorari—
indicate that the debate over religious symbolism in public spaces has hard-
ly died down.356 For this reason, it is particularly worthwhile to consider 
how the Court might approach such cases in the future. 
As explained above, there is reason to be wary of the Court’s avoid-
ance of underlying issues concerning the social meaning of religious sym-
bolism and the proper role of public religious speech in a pluralistic society. 
While appearing to resolve disputes in a neutral, legally defensible manner 
without aggravating cultural dissension, the Court may simply be papering 
over already-existing sentiments of exclusion and subordination. Using the 
law and language of property in religious symbol cases does not actually, or 
necessarily, turn a cultural and constitutional dispute into an ownership 
quibble. Rather, it only aggravates the naturalization of hierarchy and ex-
clusion that the endorsement/equality inquiry was intended to combat. For 
this reason, a return to the underlying First Amendment principles is prefer-
able to avoiding them. 
Moreover, for the reasons described in Part III.B.1, the Court’s use of 
property is overly simplistic. Property theorists and even the Court itself 
have long recognized that the existence of a property right is often only the 
beginning, not the end, of the inquiry, especially when public values are at 
stake. Public property, after all, is held in public trust. Thus, a more inclu-
sive and accurate understanding of property would require the Court, in 
religious display cases, to consider property in a more nuanced way, and as 
merely one set of factors in the overall endorsement/equality analysis, ra-
ther than as its final answer. Though ownership is relevant to questions of 
attribution, social meaning, and access, it cannot define and limit them in 
the formalistic way the Court has suggested. A more nuanced and thus 
more desirable approach would recognize the complex relationship among 
property, identity, attribution, and expression. 
Finally, if the Court’s decisions are driven in large part by a desire to 
turn down the temperature on religious symbolism disputes, it could focus 
on refining the remedial side of the constitutional equation, rather than 
changing its analysis of the merits. To the extent that the Court is con-
cerned, for example, about the social message that may be sent when 
longstanding monuments are dismantled in response to First Amendment 
lawsuits—as various Justices have suggested they are—it might encourage 
a more sensitive approach to remediation in such cases.357 Interestingly, 
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both Justices Breyer and Alito have explicitly expressed such concerns, and 
both have hinted at precisely such a remedy-based solution.358 In Buono, 
Justice Alito suggested that the government might have “supplement[ed] 
the monument on Sunrise Rock so that it appropriately recognized the reli-
gious diversity of the American soldiers who gave their lives in the First 
World War.”359 Though perhaps still raising concerns about government 
endorsement of religion over nonreligion, such a solution could in some 
circumstances be appropriate—perhaps even more so if supplemented with 
secular memorials as well. Similarly, Justice Breyer devoted his Buono 
dissent to the notion that trial courts have broad discretion to shape and 
enforce their injunctive decrees, such that they are entitled to deference 
from appellate courts.360 Of course, detailed analysis of possible remedies, 
their pros and cons, and their constitutionality is beyond the scope of this 
Article; this Article simply argues that the possibility of more flexible re-
mediation has not been fully explored in religious display cases, and it may 
hold potential for preventing the aggravation of existing cultural disputes 
while still recognizing and elaborating the underlying First Amendment 
values. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court appears to have turned to property law and proper-
ty rhetoric as a way of simplifying or avoiding difficult First Amendment 
questions involving public displays of religious symbolism.361 This turn to 
property is troubling, however. The property paradigm valorizes and natu-
ralizes the acts of exclusion and discrimination in the course of expressing a 
message of religious identity. Both the endorsement test and public forum 
principles, marginalized in Summum and Buono, require reform but not 
interment; they are preferable to the current alternative. 
 
  
The demolition of this venerable if unsophisticated, monument would also have been inter-
preted by some as an arresting symbol of a Government that is not neutral but hostile on mat-
ters of religion and is bent on eliminating from all public places and symbols any trace of our 
country’s religious heritage. 
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